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FACEBOOK V. SULLIVAN: PUBLIC 
FIGURES AND NEWSWORTHINESS IN 
ONLINE SPEECH 
THOMAS E. KADRI* & KATE KLONICK†  
In the United States, there are now two systems to adjudicate disputes 
about harmful speech. The first is older and more established: the legal 
system in which judges apply constitutional law to limit tort claims alleging 
injuries caused by speech. The second is newer and less familiar: the 
content-moderation system in which platforms like Facebook implement the 
rules that govern online speech. These platforms are not bound by the First 
Amendment. But, as it turns out, they rely on many of the tools used by courts 
to resolve tensions between regulating harmful speech and preserving free 
expression—particularly the entangled concepts of “public figures” and 
“newsworthiness.” 
This Article offers the first empirical analysis of how judges and content 
moderators have used these two concepts to shape the boundaries of free 
speech. It first introduces the legal doctrines developed by the “Old 
Governors,” exploring how courts have shaped the constitutional concepts 
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of public figures and newsworthiness in the face of tort claims for 
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The Article then turns to the “New Governors” and examines how 
Facebook’s content-moderation system channeled elements of the courts’ 
reasoning for imposing First Amendment limits on tort liability.  
By exposing the similarities and differences between how the two 
systems have understood these concepts, this Article offers lessons for both 
courts and platforms as they confront new challenges posed by online 
speech. It exposes the pitfalls of using algorithms to identify public figures; 
explores the diminished utility of setting rules based on voluntary 
involvement in public debate; and analyzes the dangers of ad hoc and 
unaccountable newsworthiness determinations. Both courts and platforms 
must adapt to the new speech ecosystem that companies like Facebook have 
helped create, particularly the way that viral content has shifted normative 
intuitions about who deserves harsher rules in disputes about harmful 
speech, be it in law or content moderation. 
Finally, the Article concludes by exploring what this comparison 
reveals about the structural role platforms play in today’s speech ecosystem 
and how it illuminates new solutions. These platforms act as legislature, 
executive, judiciary, and press—but without any separation of powers to 
establish checks and balances. A change to this model is already occurring 
at one platform: Facebook is creating a new Oversight Board that will 
hopefully provide due process to users on the platform’s speech decisions 
and transparency about how content-moderation policy is made, including 
how concepts related to newsworthiness and public figures are applied.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2017, a group of American neo-Nazis convened for a 
“Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Amid scenes of chaos, 
James Alex Fields drove his car through a crowd and killed a young counter-
protestor, Heather Heyer. The next day, a blog post from the white 
supremacist website, The Daily Stormer, was shared over 65,000 times on 
Facebook: “Heather Heyer, Woman Killed in Road Rage Incident was a Fat, 
Childless 32-Year-Old Slut.”1 To some, this post looked like provocative but 
permissible commentary about someone who was now newsworthy; to 
others, it seemed like harmful speech that Facebook should remove as a 
violation of its internal rules.2 When people complained about the post, 
Facebook’s rulemakers debated: Should it stay up or come down? 
Ultimately, they hedged. The platform removed every link to the post unless 
the user included a caption condemning The Daily Stormer.3 
This episode reveals something important about free speech in the 
digital age: the judiciary is no longer the only actor that adjudicates claims 
about harmful speech. In the United States, we now have two systems to 
adjudicate these disputes. The first is older and more established: the legal 
system in which judges apply constitutional law to limit tort claims alleging 
injuries caused by harmful speech.4 The second is newer and less familiar: 
 
 
 1. Talia Lavin, The Neo-Nazis of The Daily Stormer Wander the Digital Wilderness, NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-neo-nazis-of-the-
daily-stormer-wander-the-digital-wilderness [https://perma.cc/8XL7-UYKV]; see also Casey Newton, 
Facebook Is Deleting Links to a Viral Attack on a Charlottesville Victim, THE VERGE (Aug. 14, 2017, 
8:30 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/14/16147126/facebook-delete-viral-post-charlottesville-
daily-stormer [https://perma.cc/JLF2-AT2G]. 
 2. See Julia Angwin et al., Have You Experienced Hate Speech on Facebook? We Want to Hear 
from You., PROPUBLICA (Aug. 29, 2017, 10:05 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/have-you-
experienced-hate-speech-on-facebook-we-want-to-hear-from-you [https://perma.cc/A8PF-MC4U]. 
 3. Newton, supra note 1. 
 4. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 381 (1967) (privacy); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (defamation). On the history and complications of constitutionalizing tort law, 
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the content-moderation system in which platforms like Facebook implement 
the rules that govern online speech.5 These platforms aren’t bound by the 
First Amendment. But, as it turns out, they rely on many of the tools used by 
courts to resolve tensions between regulating harmful speech and preserving 
free expression—particularly the entangled concepts of “public figures” and 
“newsworthiness.” 
This Article analyzes how judges and content moderators have used 
these two concepts to shape the boundaries of free speech. By exposing the 
similarities and differences between how the two systems have understood 
these concepts, this Article offers lessons for both courts and platforms as 
they confront new challenges posed by online speech. Finally, the Article 
briefly explores how this comparison reveals the structural changes that 
platforms like Facebook should make to address these challenges and bring 
oversight to their governance of online speech. 
Part I introduces the legal doctrines developed by the “Old Governors,” 
exploring how courts have shaped the concepts of public figures and 
newsworthiness in the face of tort claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Part II turns to the “New 
Governors” and examines Facebook’s content-moderation system. Drawing 
on internal Facebook documents and several years of exclusive interviews 
with current and former Facebook employees, this Part reveals for the first 
time how and why the platform created its own rules related to public figures 
and newsworthiness. In so doing, it shows that Facebook’s rulemaking—
consciously or unconsciously—channeled elements of the courts’ reasoning 
when imposing First Amendment limits on tort liability. 
 
 
see Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1650, 1672–84 (2009); Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of 
Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 251–54 (2010). 
 5. For foundational work on the development of the idea of private governance by speech 
platforms, see REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED 149–65 (2012) (analyzing 
platforms through the lens of “governance” at the “new digital sovereigns” of “Facebookistan” and 
“Googledom”); see also Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1819–22 (2012); 
Robert Gorwa, What is Platform Governance?, 22 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 854, 854 (2019); Kate Klonick, 
The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech , 131 HARV. L. REV. 
1598, 1616–18 (2018); Thomas Kadri, How Supreme a Court?, SLATE (Nov. 19, 2018, 1:59 PM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/facebook-zuckerberg-independent-speech-content-appeals-
court.html [https://perma.cc/524G-QYLJ] [hereinafter Kadri, How Supreme a Court?]; Thomas Kadri, 
Speech vs. Speakers, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2018, 12:56 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/01/twitters-
new-rules-blur-the-line-between-extremists-speakers-and-their-speech.html [https://perma.cc/JW9B-FF 
Q6] [hereinafter Kadri, Speech vs. Speakers]; Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, Opinion, How to Make 
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Guided by this background, Part III exposes the similarities and 
differences between how the private and public governance systems have 
understood the concepts of public figures and newsworthiness. Through this 
comparative analysis, this Part addresses how both courts and platforms 
should confront new challenges posed by online speech. Judges and platform 
policymakers must adapt to the new speech ecosystem that companies like 
Facebook have helped create, particularly the way that virality has shifted 
normative intuitions about who deserves harsher rules in disputes about 
harmful speech, be it in constitutional law or content moderation.6 This Part 
first exposes the pitfalls of using algorithms to identify public figures, 
critiquing Facebook’s use of online news aggregators and news sources to 
determine public-figure status on the platform—a mechanism that results in 
Facebook removing too much benign speech and preserving too much 
harmful speech. It then explains how the internet has eroded traditional 
reasons for specially protecting speech about public figures because these 
reasons rest principally on assumptions that people become public figures by 
choice and that, as public figures, they have greater access to channels of 
rebuttal.7 These assumptions are becoming increasingly outdated in the 
digital age, given the dynamics of online speech8 and the ubiquity of means 
to engage in counter-speech.9 As a result, this Part reassesses the normative 
utility of distinguishing between “voluntary” and “involuntary” public 
figures to judge who deserves harsher rules in courts and on platforms, 
discussing the alternative use of “sympathy” as a normative barometer. 
Lastly, this Part assesses the risks posed by platforms creating ad hoc 
exceptions for newsworthy content. Although there are significant 
advantages to increasing human review in content moderation, the current 
 
 
 6. See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3−6 (1970) 
(developing the idea of the First Amendment creating a “system” of free speech). 
 7. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 
U.S. 130, 154 (1967). 
 8. See DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 11–12 
(2014) (explaining how social media creates new challenges because of the “persistence,” “visibility,” 
“spreadability,” and “searchability” of content); Kate Klonick, Re-Shaming the Debate: Social Norms, 
Shame, and Regulation in an Internet Age, 75 MD. L. REV. 1029, 1053–54 (2015) (describing how the 
internet changes social norm enforcement by eliminating frictions of time, geography, personal reputation 
and cost). See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) (describing 
cyber harassment and exploring ways to combat it); Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech 
Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2014) (discussing the changing approach to speech regulation).  
 9. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1833 (1995) 
(predicting, even before the advent of social media, that new technologies would “both democratize the 
information marketplace—make it more accessible to comparatively poor speakers as well as rich ones—
and diversify it”); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 19 (2006); Jack M. Balkin, Digital 
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society , 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). 
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structure of most platforms means that decisions in this area lack 
transparency, expertise, and consistency. 
This Article concludes by looking briefly at the Facebook Oversight 
Board, an independent institution that Facebook is currently creating to 
provide users with transparency and procedure around content moderation. 
Ideally, such a Board will provide users with explanation and consistency 
around how the concepts of newsworthiness and public figures are applied. 
This institution may ultimately result in users gaining procedural and 
structural protections in the new, private system regulating their expression. 
The Article concludes that more platforms should adopt such oversight 
mechanisms to protect users’ speech rights and provide accountability, 
transparency, and due process. 
I.  PUBLIC FIGURES AND NEWSWORTHINESS IN OLD 
GOVERNANCE: TORT LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN 
THE COURTS 
Within the vast world of tort law, which aims to provide relief when 
people are harmed, are what Jack Balkin calls “communications torts.”10 
Communications torts are “a category of legal causes of action in which 
people are harmed by speech acts of others.”11 The concept of 
communications torts is particularly salient in the digital age because, as 
Balkin foresaw, “all activity in virtual worlds must begin as a form of 
speech” such that “[w]hen people injure each other in virtual worlds in ways 
that the law will recognize, they are almost always committing some form of 
communications tort.”12  
Unsurprisingly, then, legal claims involving communications torts will 
often implicate the First Amendment because they are premised on harms 
caused by speech. When adjudicating these claims, the Supreme Court has 
looked at whether the claimant is a public figure or whether the underlying 
speech is newsworthy. This Part focuses on how the concepts of public 
figures and newsworthiness have curtailed three communications torts: 
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. By unfolding the history and underlying rationales of the Court’s 
First Amendment doctrine in this area, this Part provides context for Part II’s 
exploration of how Facebook developed its own rules surrounding these 
 
 
 10. Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 73 (2004). 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. 
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same concepts. As we will see in Part III, although these public and private 
doctrines evolved in seemingly disparate contexts, they share many 
similarities—and, in a new era of online speech, some critical differences.13 
A.  DEFAMATION 
The tort of defamation has played a central role in the development of 
First Amendment law. Although liability for false speech that injures 
someone’s reputation was long thought to raise no constitutional concern, 
the Supreme Court eventually developed an intricate web of rules to restrain 
the reach of defamation and protect free speech. The story begins in March 
1960 when L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner from Alabama, sued the 
New York Times for defamation after the newspaper published an 
advertisement criticizing the Montgomery Police Department’s treatment of 
civil-rights demonstrators.14 Sullivan claimed that the advertisement 
contained falsehoods that damaged his reputation. His case made it all the 
way to the Supreme Court.15  
In addressing the threshold issue in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,16 
Justice William Brennan explained that torts like defamation “can claim no 
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations” and “must be measured 
by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”17 Although he 
acknowledged that the advertisement contained falsehoods, he explained that 
“erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” and “must be protected if 
the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they 
‘need . . . to survive.’”18 Defamation claims, he said, cannot create an 
environment that “dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public 
debate.”19 To address this concern, the Court crafted a special constitutional 
rule: public figures alleging defamation must prove that the offending 
statements were made with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that the 
statement “was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
 
 
 13. Id. at 73–76. 
 14. LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY: JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT TO 
PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN 3–4 (2014). 
 15. See generally id. (providing an excellent account of this historic case); KERMIT L. HALL & 
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 
(2011) (same); Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Story of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in FIRST 
AMENDMENT STORIES 229 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012) (same). 
 16. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 17. Id. at 269. 
 18. Id. at 271–72 (first alteration in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 
(1963)).  
 19. Id. at 279. 
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not.”20 
The justices in Sullivan identified two justifications for creating this 
constitutional hurdle for public figures. The central reason—one that Justice 
Brennan discussed at length in the majority opinion—was the democratic 
imperative of preserving “debate on public issues.”21 This rationale reflects 
a theory of the First Amendment grounded in democratic self-governance. 
Various scholars have shaped the contours of this theory and glossed it in 
different ways,22 but a central concern for many of them is the public’s need 
to have the information necessary to engage in self-government.23 Under this 
rationale, the First Amendment protects the public’s entitlement “to all 
information that is necessary for informed governance” because “the public, 
in its role as the electorate, [is] ultimately responsible for political 
decisions.”24 The self-governance theory is often cached out in these 
“educative” terms by justifying “speech protection not because of any 




 20. Id. at 279–80. 
 21. Id. at 270. 
 22. Compare, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) (developing a listener-focused account for the relationship between free speech 
and self-government through the idea of the educative function of a town meeting), with ROBERT C. POST, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995) (developing a speaker-
focused account that connects free speech and self-government by exploring the legitimating function 
served by public discourse). 
 23. See generally Thomas E. Kadri, Drawing Trump Naked: Curbing the Right of Publicity to 
Protect Public Discourse, 78 MD. L. REV. 899, 905 (2019) (discussing theorists who hold this view and 
dubbing them “educative” theorists). 
 24. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law 
Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 999 (1989). 
 25. Kadri, supra note 23, at 913; see also OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 13 (1996) (attesting that “[w]e allow people to speak so 
others can vote” because “[s]peech allows people to vote intelligently and freely, aware of all the options 
and in possession of all the relevant information”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 55 (1960) (arguing that the First Amendment “has no concern 
about the ‘needs of many men to express their opinions’” but rather is concerned with “the common needs 
of all the members of the body politic”); id. at 56–57, 61 (criticizing Zechariah Chafee, Jr.’s “inclusion 
of an individual interest within the scope of the First Amendment,” and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
“excessive individualism” on this front); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 1405, 1409–10 (1986) (arguing that “[t]he purpose of free speech is not individual self-actualization, 
but rather the preservation of democracy, and the right of a people, as a people, to decide what kind of 
life it wishes to live”); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987) (framing the 
individual speech right in instrumental terms, worthy of protection “only when it enriches public debate”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 501 (2000) (maintaining that 
the primary purpose of free speech is to promote deliberative democracy— “a system in which citizens 
are informed about public issues and able to make judgments on the basis of reasons”). For some skeptical 
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Today, Sullivan is often framed as a case that deals solely with the 
importance of speech about “public figures,” but this undervalues its 
significance to a much broader doctrine. Justice Brennan’s concern was not 
limited to protecting speech about a plaintiff’s political position as a 
government official, but rather what the justice called a “profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”26 The focus was not simply on 
Sullivan’s social status, but also—at least implicitly—on whether the speech 
at issue related to issues that the public needed to know in order to self-
govern. The question whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure is part 
of a subtler inquiry about whether the speech in question touches on a matter 
of public concern.27 As a result, an important part of Sullivan’s legacy is that 
it weaved self-governance theory into First Amendment doctrine. 
Although the self-governance theory animated the Court’s opinion in 
Sullivan, a second rationale for treating public figures differently appeared 
in Justice Arthur Goldberg’s concurrence: public figures enjoy “equal if not 
greater access than most private citizens to media of communication.”28 
Though not part of the majority’s reasoning, this additional justification 
eventually animated the development of public-figure doctrine. When a 
university athletic director and a prominent political activist sued two 
newspapers for defamation in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court 
adopted Justice Goldberg’s rationale by justifying its decision on the basis 
that plaintiffs “had sufficient access to the means of counterargument” to 
rebut the alleged falsehoods.29 The Court also echoed the self-governance 
rationale in explaining why Sullivan’s constitutional rule applied to plaintiffs 
who were not government officials,30 explaining that the “public interest” in 
being informed about nonpolitical public figures was “not less” than being 
informed about public officials.31 Thus, although the Court’s holding hinged 
on the plaintiffs’ social status, the justification for it was again rooted in the 
 
 
treatment of these theorists, see J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 
104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1935–90 (1995); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the 
Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1109–23 (1993). 
 26. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 
 27. See Catherine Hancock, Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First Amendment Defamation 
Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 85 (2005); Post, supra note 24, at 997. 
 28. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 304–05 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 29. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135–41, 155 (1967). 
 30. Id. at 155. 
 31. Id. at 154–55; see also id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result) (declaring that 
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importance of robust debate on “public issues,”32 as well as the fact that the 
plaintiffs could participate in that debate by virtue of their prominence. 
Given the Court’s reliance on self-governance theory to protect speech 
on “public issues,” one might wonder why the Court focused on the 
plaintiff’s status instead of simply asking whether the speech at issue was 
necessary for the public to know. The Court flirted with such a reformulation 
of the doctrine in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., in which a plurality 
extended Sullivan’s rule to all defamation claims involving speech on 
matters of public concern, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a public or 
private figure.33 Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion reasoned that a matter 
“of public or general interest . . . cannot suddenly become less so merely 
because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the 
individual did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved.”34 In his view, 
“[t]he public’s primary interest is in the event,” not the individual’s social 
status.35 Any interest in the individual’s prominence was merely a corollary 
to that primary interest, for “the public focus is on the conduct of the 
participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the 
participant’s prior anonymity or notoriety.”36 In order to “honor the 
commitment to robust debate on public issues . . . embodied in the First 
Amendment” that the Court had recognized in Sullivan, Justice Brennan 
concluded that the constitutional rule must apply “to all discussion and 
communication involving matters of public or general concern, without 
regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous,” though 
quite what constituted a matter of “public or general concern” was left rather 
opaque.37 
Rosenbloom’s doctrinal simplicity—if jettisoning the “public figure” 
concept for the ambiguous notion of the “public or general concern” can be 
considered simplicity—was fleeting. Just three years later, the Court held in 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. that Sullivan’s rule should not apply to claims 
brought by private figures.38 In drawing lines between public and private 
figures, the Court imagined two, and possibly three, types of public 
figures: general public figures; limited-purpose public figures; and, perhaps, 
 
 
 32. Id. at 147. 
 33. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S 29, 43–44 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
 34. Id. at 43. 
 35. Id. (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 43–44. 
 38. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–48 (1974). 
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involuntary public figures.39 General public figures “occupy positions of 
such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for 
all purposes,”40 while limited-purpose public figures “thrust themselves to 
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the 
resolution of the issues involved.”41 Notably, the Court left undefined the 
third (possible) type of public figure, observing only that “truly involuntary 
public figures must be exceedingly rare.”42 This remark was prophetic: the 
Court has never encountered its mythical character in the forty years that 
have since passed.43 
The demarcation of different types of public figures has developed into 
a central concern in the Court’s defamation jurisprudence. In contrast to the 
atrophied idea of the involuntary public figure, the Court has developed the 
“voluntariness” element at length. In Gertz, the Court explained that both 
general and limited-purpose public figures “invite attention and comment” 
and thus have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury 
from defamatory falsehood concerning them.”44 Building from this premise, 
the Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone held that a woman who divorced a 
member of a wealthy socialite family was not a public figure.45 The Court 
cautioned against adopting a concept of public figures that might create too 
large a class, and explained that a person needed more than local notoriety 
to become a public figure.46 The Court stressed that the divorcée did not 
“freely choose to publicize issues as to the propriety of her married life” but 
rather was “compelled” to go to court to end her marriage.47 Her actions, 
then, were “no more voluntary in a realistic sense” than those of a criminal 
defendant “called upon to defend his interests in court.”48 In addition, the 
Court refused to equate “public controversy” with “all controversies of 
interest to the public” because doing so would reinstate the Rosenbloom rule 
 
 
 39. See W. Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After All, 21 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21 (2003) (“[T]here is disagreement as to whether the Supreme Court identified two 
or three categories of public figure status.”). 
 40. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Finding the Lost Involuntary Public Figure, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 
951, 952 (claiming that “involuntary public figures” as category of individuals in First Amendment 
defamation jurisprudence “has become lost”).  
 44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
 45. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424.U.S. 448, 453 (1976). 
 46. Id. at 450–53. 
 47. Id. at 454. 
 48. Id. (citation omitted). 
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that disavowed the significance of a plaintiff’s social status.49  
Since Firestone, the Court has repeatedly held that individuals who did 
not voluntarily garner attention were not public figures. In Wolston v. 
Reader’s Digest Association, for example, the Court declined to apply the 
label to a witness who missed a grand-jury hearing investigating Cold War 
espionage.50 The witness had not “voluntarily thrust” or “injected” himself 
into the public eye; rather, the Court declared that “[i]t would be more 
accurate to say that [he] was dragged unwillingly into the controversy.”51 
Similarly, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, in which a professor sued a U.S. 
Senator who criticized him for wasting federal funds, the Court stressed that 
the professor remained a private figure because he had not “thrust himself or 
his views into public controversy to influence others.”52 The Court rejected 
the lower courts’ conclusion that the professor became a public figure in part 
because he gained some prominence and access to the media after the 
Senator had allegedly defamed him.53 Although various media outlets 
reported the professor’s response to the Senator’s criticism, the Court 
stressed that the professor “did not have the regular and continuing access to 
the media that is one of the accouterments of having become a public 
figure.”54 In other words, the controversy itself could not transform the 
professor into a public figure simply because he appeared in the news as a 
result. 
As these cases show, although the Court glossed the public-figure 
doctrine with a new taxonomy in Gertz and its progeny, the basic rationales 
for affording heightened constitutional protection for speech about public 
figures tracked the pair of rationales originally suggested in Sullivan and 
Butts. First, speech about public figures requires protection for “debate on 
public issues [to] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”55 The pervasive 
power of some people makes their behaviors a matter of public interest, just 
as the behaviors of someone who thrusts herself into a public controversy 
become a matter of public interest, and the public needs to know about these 
behaviors if it is to engage meaningfully in self-governance. Second, public 
figures are “less vulnerable to injury from defamatory statements” because 
 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 166–67 (1979). 
 51. Id. at 166. 
 52. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979). 
 53. Id. at 134–36. 
 54. Id. at 136. 
 55. N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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they generally have greater ability to engage in “self-help” by “counter[ing] 
criticism and expos[ing] the falsehood and fallacies of defamatory 
statements” in the media.56 These dual rationales sustain much of modern 
public-figure doctrine to this day.57 
It’s crucial to note, however, that the Court’s doctrine also reflects two 
caveats to these rationales. The first caveat relates to the significance of the 
idea of “voluntariness.” The idea that a person chooses to place herself in the 
public eye underlies the “normative consideration”58 that public figures are 
“less deserving”59 of protection from defamation because, unlike private 
figures, they have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury 
from defamatory falsehood.”60 In striking the balance between protecting 
free speech and remedying harmful speech, the Court has continued to cling 
to the importance of voluntariness, even when the idea of voluntariness 
potentially conflicts with the public-figure doctrine’s embrace of self-
governance theory and its assertion that private figures lack the means of 
rebuttal. After all, the fact that a plaintiff freely chose to enter the public 
arena might not mean that he or she commands more public interest or that 
he or she has greater access to the media—private figures might get caught 
up in events that raise issues of great importance to the public, and the 
attention that flows from these events might furnish these private figures 
with ample opportunity to respond in the media. Nonetheless, the Court has 
embraced this doctrinal tension to date. 
The second caveat to the rationales developed in Sullivan and Butts 
concerns the Rosenbloom retraction in Gertz. The Rosenbloom plurality had 
sought to abandon distinctions based on social status,61 and even based on 
voluntariness,62 but the Court in Gertz clawed back the significance of both 
distinctions in the constitutional analysis. Had the Court’s sole concern been 
to preserve “debate on public issues,” Rosenbloom’s rule would have carried 
the day, for Justice Brennan was surely right when he observed in 
 
 
 56. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164. 
 57. See generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Ben Zion Lahav, Public Interest vs. Private Lives—
Affording Public Figures Privacy in the Digital Era: The Three Principle Filtering Model, 19 J. CONST. 
L. 975, 983–84 (2017) (outlining the various components of the Court’s public-figure doctrine as (1) 
“access and control over the media”; (2) “enrollment in a special role in the public eye”; (3) “willingly 
(voluntarily) choosing to engage in a public role, inviting invasion of privacy risks”; and (4) “public 
controversy”). 
 58. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)). 
 61. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S 29, 43–44 (1971). 
 62. Id. at 43. 
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Rosenbloom that matters of public concern “cannot suddenly become less so 
merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense 
the individual did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved.”63 Yet 
despite this fact, the Court chose not to embrace a more speech-protective 
rule that would cover all speech on matters of public concern. Gertz and later 
cases recognized the fundamental importance of free speech, but the Court 
has nonetheless insisted upon a different constitutional regime for private 
figures. 
These two caveats reveal something important about the balance that 
the Court has struck between preserving free speech and protecting people 
from harmful speech. In the context of false and defamatory speech, the 
Court has developed a constitutional commitment that the First Amendment 
must limit tort liability in order to protect robust public debate. But the Court 
has also recognized that the public’s eagerness to engage in such debate is 
not always sufficient to override all attempts to tackle harmful speech 
through defamation law. As the next section reveals, the Court has struck a 
different balance when faced with other tort claims that raise free-speech 
concerns. 
B.  INVASION OF PRIVACY 
Given the distinctions drawn in defamation law between private and 
public figures and matters of private and public concern, it is unsurprising 
that privacy law has attracted similar constitutional concepts. Like the 
defamation tort, privacy torts often involve allegations that a speech act has 
caused harm to someone, and thus these claims regularly implicate the First 
Amendment. After Sullivan constitutionalized defamation law through the 
public-figure doctrine, defendants in privacy actions began raising 
arguments that similar limitations should be placed on privacy torts in order 
to preserve free speech. The resulting doctrine borrows heavily from the 
Court’s defamation jurisprudence but differs in important respects.  
Just a few years after Sullivan, the Court applied “the First Amendment 
principles pronounced in [Sullivan]” within the privacy realm in Time, Inc. 
v. Hill,64 partially migrating Sullivan’s rule outside the defamation context 
for the first time. The case developed after James Hill and his family were 
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 64. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967); see also Hancock, supra note 27, at 105–12 
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held hostage by escaped convicts.65 Hill sued Life Magazine after it 
published an article suggesting that a new play portrayed his family’s story.66 
Although he maintained that the article was “false and untrue,”67 his claim 
sounded not in defamation but in the privacy tort of unreasonably placing a 
person in a “false light” before the public.68 Hill argued that he was not a 
public figure but a private citizen who had “involuntarily become 
newsworthy” after he and his family were victims of a crime.69  
Justice Brennan again delivered the Court’s opinion, stressing—as he 
had done in Sullivan—that “[f]reedom of discussion . . . must embrace all 
issues about which information is needed.”70 Foreshadowing an issue that 
would become crucial in the Court’s defamation jurisprudence, Justice 
Brennan declined to base a constitutional rule on “the distinction . . . between 
the relative opportunities of the public official and the private individual to 
rebut” harmful speech.71 Indeed, he eschewed consideration of the plaintiff’s 
social status entirely, as he would later attempt to do in Rosenbloom. He 
focused instead on the need to preserve debate on “matters of public 
interest”72 and, in so doing, “declared an expansive view of the First 
Amendment as protection for all newsworthy material,”73 regardless of 
whether the plaintiff is a private figure.74 The decision reflected the self-
governance theory of the First Amendment, justified as it was by the fact that 
the Hill’s ordeal concerned “issues about which information is needed” for 
the public to govern itself effectively.75 
Hill gave constitutional weight to an idea that had deep foundations in 
privacy law. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s seminal work advocating 
for a vigorous right to privacy nonetheless stressed that such a right should 
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not prohibit speech on matters “of public or general interest,”76 and the first 
decision acknowledging a right of privacy contained a similar 
qualification.77 Sometimes referred to as speech that’s “newsworthy,”78 
speech on matters of public concern is said to lie “at the core of the First 
Amendment”79 for reasons that self-governance theorists have detailed at 
length.80 
The privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts has also been 
cabined by constitutional concerns for free speech. As with the false-light 
privacy claim in Hill, there can be no liability under the disclosure tort when 
the speech in question is of “legitimate public concern.”81 But while the Hill 
Court seemed ambivalent to the plaintiff’s status, courts have superficially 
entertained a distinction between private and public figures who bring 
disclosure claims. As an initial matter, this is because people live much of 
their lives out in the open; as a result, the disclosure tort will often be 
inapplicable because many facts about people are not truly “private.”82 A 
complication arises, however, when people seek to shield certain aspects of 
their lives from public view: whereas private figures might rely on the 
disclosure tort, the “legitimate interest of the public” may extend “to some 




 76. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 
(1890). 
 77. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905) (“The truth may be spoken, 
written, or printed about all matters of a public nature, as well as matters of a private nature in which the 
public has a legitimate interest.”); see also Post, supra note 24, at 996. 
 78. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 400 (1967) (Black, J., concurring); see also FLA. STAT. 
§ 90.5015(1)(b) (2017) (“‘News’ means information of public concern relating to local, statewide, 
national, or worldwide issues or events.”); Kadri, supra note 23, at 912–13; Mary-Rose Papandrea, 
Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 578–81 (2007) (observing that 
the newsworthiness standard “involves essentially the same inquiry as a ‘public concern’ test”).  
 79. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (“[E]xpression on public issues ‘has always rested on the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” (citation omitted)); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 
519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997) (“Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms 
of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment . . . .”). 
 80. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121–65 
(1993); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–35 
(1971); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255. 
 81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (noting that this rule 
applies as a matter of both common law and constitutional law). 
 82. Id. § 652D cmt. e. 
 83. Id. § 652D cmt. f; see also id. § 652D cmt. h (noting that interest about a public figure “may 
legitimately extend, to some reasonable degree, to further information concerning the individual and to 
facts about him, which are not public and which, in the case of one who had not become a public figure, 
 
  
2019] FACEBOOK V. SULLIVAN 53 
Although courts recognize the concept of the public figure under the 
disclosure tort, they do not discriminate between the voluntary and 
involuntary public figure as they do in defamation law. The Restatement 
does draw a distinction between voluntary and involuntary public figures, 
but it is a distinction without a doctrinal difference.84 The involuntary public 
figure is an enigmatic and elusive character in defamation law,85 but in 
privacy law she is pervasive: she is the person who commits a crime or is 
accused of it,86 she is the victim or witness of crime and catastrophe,87 and 
she is even the hapless soul who inadvertently gets caught up in “events that 
attract public attention.”88 Thus, even if she does nothing to “thrust” herself 
voluntarily into the vortex of a public controversy, the involuntary public 
figure is “properly subject to the public interest” and subject to the same 
constitutional rules as those who freely enter the public arena.89 Her desire 
to avoid the limelight is irrelevant, as is her lack of access to the media as a 
means of engaging in counter-speech.90 
This complex web of considerations creates a paradoxically simple rule: 
there is no privacy invasion when the fact disclosed is of “legitimate public 
concern.” This is true for disclosures about private figures and disclosures 
about public figures, whether they be voluntary or involuntary. The only 
wrinkle is that some facts about public figures would not be of “legitimate 
public concern” were they instead about private figures. But all that means 
is that certain facts about public figures—even facts that would otherwise be 
“private”—are matters of legitimate public concern because of the person’s 
social status. The court’s status determination, then, serves simply as a proxy 
for deciding whether a particular fact is of legitimate public concern—that 
 
 
would be regarded as an invasion of his purely private life”).  
 84. A voluntary public figure “voluntarily places himself in the public eye, by engaging in public 
activities, or by assuming a prominent role in institutions or activities having general economic, cultural, 
social or similar public interest, or by submitting himself or his work for public judgment.” Id. § 652D 
cmt. e. Involuntary public figures, by contrast, “have not sought publicity or consented to it, but through 
their own conduct or otherwise have become a legitimate subject of public interest”—“[t]hey have, in 
other words, become ‘news.’” Id. § 652D cmt. f. 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 21–25.  
 86. See, e.g., Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 157 F. Supp. 240, 241 (D. Del. 1957); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f. (noting that criminals are involuntary public figures because they 
“may not only not seek publicity but may make every possible effort to avoid it”). 
 87. See, e.g., Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 972–73 (Ky. 1929); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f. 
 88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f; see, e.g., Jacova v. S. Radio & Television 
Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 40 (Fla. 1955). 
 89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f. 
 90. See id. 
 
  
54 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:37 
is, whether it implicates the public’s ability to engage in self-governance.  
This means that defining “legitimate public concern” carries a lot of 
analytical weight; and indeed, a privacy claim will often rise and fall on this 
determination alone. One might think that the definition is both descriptive 
and circular: a matter is of legitimate public concern when the public is 
concerned about the matter. The Restatement gestures at this conception 
when it observes that “[i]ncluded within the scope of legitimate public 
concern are matters of the kind customarily regarded as ‘news’” or matters 
that have “popular appeal.”91 This descriptive definition means that, “[t]o a 
considerable extent, . . . publishers and broadcasters have themselves 
defined the term, as a glance at any morning paper will confirm.”92 In short, 
the reporting of a fact in the news is highly probative, if not conclusive, of 
its newsworthiness. 
Broad deference to the news media is an idea with some constitutional 
pedigree. Given that many privacy claims are brought against the press, the 
vaulted status of speech on matters of public concern has sometimes been 
called the “privilege to report news” or the “privilege to publicize 
newsworthy matters.”93 In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Court 
barred a disclosure claim brought against a media company that reported a 
rape victim’s name obtained from public court records.94 In holding that “the 
press cannot be sanctioned for publishing” information found in public 
documents, the Court stressed that “reliance must rest upon the judgment of 
those who decide what to publish or broadcast.”95 
Despite the sweeping language in some judicial opinions, the reality is 
that many courts have shunned a purely descriptive definition of 
newsworthiness that would yield entirely to the press. The deference is broad 
but not absolute.96 Much hinges on whether the public’s interest in knowing 
a particular fact is “legitimate.” The legitimacy determination, in turn, 
considers “the customs and conventions of the community,” meaning that 
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“what is proper becomes a matter of the community mores.”97 In the 
language of the Restatement: 
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of 
information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and 
sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a 
reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he 
had no concern. The limitations, in other words, are those of common 
decency, having due regard to the freedom of the press and its reasonable 
leeway to choose what it will tell the public, but also due regard to the 
feelings of the individual and the harm that will be done to him by the 
exposure.98 
These principles were at the heart of a recent blockbuster privacy 
lawsuit between former wrestler Hulk Hogan and the now-defunct news 
organization Gawker. Hogan sued for invasion of privacy after Gawker 
published an excerpted sex tape that showed him ensconced with his best 
friend’s wife. Although multiple courts refused to enjoin publication of the 
tape on the grounds that it was newsworthy,99 a jury disagreed and awarded 
Hogan massive damages.100 Evidently, the jury concluded that publishing 
the tape amounted to “morbid and sensational prying” into Hogan’s private 
life that violated “common decency,” despite Hogan’s clear status as a public 
figure.101 
C.  INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
The constitutional concepts of public figures and newsworthiness have 
developed in relation to a third tort: intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (“IIED”). Under this tort, a plaintiff must show that the defendant 
“intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that 
caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.”102 When the 
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“extreme and outrageous conduct” consists of actions protected by the First 
Amendment, courts have crafted rules to limit the tort’s incursion on free 
speech. 
The Court’s first tussle with the IIED tort came in Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. v. Falwell, a legal battle fit—and indeed destined103—for Hollywood.104 
Jerry Falwell, a nationally renowned Christian minister, sued Hustler 
Magazine and its antagonistic publisher, Larry Flynt, after the magazine 
spoofed an interview with Falwell in a liquor advertisement entitled “Jerry 
Falwell talks about his first time.”105 A jury accepted Falwell’s claim that the 
parody caused him grave emotional harm, awarding him compensatory and 
punitive damages, but the Court resoundingly rejected Falwell’s claim and 
extended Sullivan’s rule to IIED claims brought by public figures.106 Justice 
William Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous Court that public figures must 
satisfy the rigors of actual malice. The decision was grounded in the Sullivan 
and Hill self-governance rationales about the need for “robust political 
debate” and “the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest 
and concern.”107 
Portions of the Hustler decision stressed the significance of Falwell’s 
social status as a public figure. The Court spoke, for instance, of the First 
Amendment right to be “critical of those who hold public office or those 
public figures who are ‘intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern 
to society at large.’”108 But this focus on social status faded away the next 
time the Court addressed the constitutionality of an IIED claim. In Snyder v. 
Phelps, the father of a soldier killed in Iraq sued parishioners from the 
Westboro Baptist Church who protested near his son’s funeral, with an array 
of signs, including “God Hates Fags,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and 
“Priests Rape Boys.”109 The father’s leading arguments in the Supreme Court 
revolved around the fact that he was a private figure who “took no action to 
inject himself into a public debate” and “did nothing to obtain the status of a 
celebrity or a public figure.”110  
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The Court, however, was unpersuaded. Rather than focusing on the 
father’s social status, the Court held that the First Amendment’s application 
to the father’s claim turned on whether the parishioners’ speech was “of 
public or private concern.”111 Chief Justice John Roberts explained that the 
First Amendment protections are “less rigorous” when speech regulations 
target matters of private concern because “[t]here is no threat to the free and 
robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a 
meaningful dialogue of ideas; and the threat of liability does not pose the risk 
of a reaction of self-censorship on matters of public import.”112 In short, the 
Court cared only about whether the underlying speech concerned issues that 
the public needed to know in order to govern itself. Given the analytical 
importance of determining whether speech is on a matter of public concern, 
one might think that the Court would clearly define this constitutional 
concept. Yet the Court candidly admitted that its boundaries “are not well 
defined”113 before describing it in disjunctive—and potentially 
contradictory—terms as speech that is (1) “fairly considered as relating to 
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” or (2) “a 
subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and 
of value and concern to the public.”114 The definition might be descriptive 
(what the public does know or wants to know) or normative (what the public 
ought to know or needs to know). As applied to the father’s claim, the Court 
concluded that the parishioners’ signs highlighted issues that are “matters of 
public import” and as such gained First Amendment protection that blocked 
liability under the IIED tort.115 The Court briefly raised the issue of 
directionality, suggesting that at least two of the signs—“You’re Going to 
Hell” and “God Hates You”—could be “viewed as containing messages 
related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically.”116 The fact that the 
Court even flagged the issue of directionality might imply that speech 
targeting particular people raises different constitutional considerations, but 
the Court never reached this question because “the overall thrust and 
dominant theme” of the signs “spoke to broader public issues.”117 
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Snyder, the Court’s most recent case concerning communication torts 
and the First Amendment, reveals several important points about the 
constitutional dynamics at play when the Court sets rules for defamation, 
privacy, and IIED claims. All three regimes reflect the Court’s concern for 
protecting robust public discourse—a concern animated by a self-
governance theory of the First Amendment. This common thread runs 
through the jurisprudence for all three torts, even as the rules differ slightly 
between them. The Court does not disparage the state’s interests in protecting 
people from harmful speech, nor does it dispute that the speech at issue in 
these cases in fact inflicted harm. Rather, the Court frames the various 
constitutional rules in prophylactic terms—as creating the conditions 
necessary for an ecosystem in which free speech can flourish. As we’ll see, 
Facebook has viewed its own rulemaking in strikingly similar terms. 
II.  PUBLIC FIGURES AND NEWSWORTHINESS IN NEW 
GOVERNANCE: CONTENT MODERATION AND FREE SPEECH AT 
FACEBOOK 
Facebook is the preeminent social network of the digital age. With over 
two billion users, the platform hosts vast amounts of content shared by 
people scattered across the globe.118 Though we might conceive of Facebook 
as a “New Governor” because of its power over online discourse, it is, of 
course, a private company that need not satisfy the First Amendment when 
policing its users’ speech.119 Nor is Facebook bound by any “Constitution” 
of its own.120 Instead, Facebook implements a system of semi-public rules 
called “Community Standards,”121 which are effectively Facebook’s “laws” 
that govern what users may say on the platform.122 
In order to implement the Community Standards, Facebook has 
developed an immense bureaucratic system to moderate user content and 
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adjudicate disputes arising from that content. Because an enormous volume 
of content is posted every day, Facebook cannot and does not proactively 
police all violations of its rules. Automated detection of violations is quite 
sophisticated and successful for various types of visual content (such as child 
pornography) but less so for written content that poses “nuanced linguistic 
challenges” (such as harassment and hate speech).123 As a result, the platform 
still relies on users to reactively flag speech that might violate its rules. 
Content reported by users is placed into an online queue for review by human 
content moderators—people working either directly for Facebook or as 
contractors who are trained to apply Facebook’s rules and determine if 
content violates the Community Standards.124 The platform removes speech 
found to be in violation; the rest remains.125 
Facebook’s first internal guidelines for content moderation were 
created largely by Dave Willner in 2009, who then joined Jud Hoffman to 
spearhead a small team that formalized and consolidated the ad hoc rules that 
Facebook’s earliest content moderators had been using.126 Ever since, 
Facebook has devoted considerable attention to the rules and procedures it 
uses to govern speech on the platform.127 Somewhat like a common-law 
legal system,128 Facebook regularly adapts its Community Standards to 
address changing circumstances, including new factual scenarios or 
technologies; criticism or feedback from outside observers; changing norms 
surrounding particular issues; and interventions from upper-level 
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management.129 Both Willner and Hoffman were heavily involved in 
developing Facebook’s rules surrounding public figures and 
newsworthiness—a history we turn to now.130 
A.  CYBERBULLYING 
Whereas the Supreme Court’s public-figure doctrine emerged from 
claims of defamation,131 Facebook’s rules surrounding public figures first 
developed in response to claims about bullying.132 In 2009, anti-
cyberbullying groups were pressuring Facebook to do more to protect 
children from online abuse.133 The problem, however, was that traditional 
academic definitions of bullying seemed impossible to translate to online 
content moderation. “How do we write a rule about bullying?” recounted 
Willner.134  
What is bullying? What do you mean by that? It’s not just things that are 
upsetting; it’s defined as a pattern of abusive or harassing unwanted 
behavior over time that is occurring between a higher power [and] a lower 
power. But that’s not an answer to the problem that resides in the 
content—you can’t determine a power differential from looking at the 
content. You often cannot even do it from looking at their profiles.135 
The apparent impossibility of employing a traditional definition of 
bullying meant that Facebook had to make a choice. It could err on the side 
of keeping up potentially harmful content, or it could err on the side of 
removing all potential acts of bullying, even if some of the removed content 
turned out to be benign. Faced with intense pressure from advocacy groups 
and media coverage on cyberbullying, Facebook opted for the latter 
approach, but with a caveat. The new presumption in favor of removing 
speech reported to be “bullying” would apply only to speech directed at 
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private figures. “What we said was, ‘Look, if you tell us this is about you, 
and you don’t like it, and you’re a private individual—you’re not a public 
figure—then we’ll take it down,’” said Hoffman.136 “Because we can’t know 
whether all of those other elements [of bullying] are met, we had to just make 
the call to create a default rule for removal of bullying.”137 
Although Hoffman denies borrowing directly from the First 
Amendment doctrine, his justification for creating this rule tracks some of 
the reasoning in Sullivan and subsequent cases.138 In order to preserve robust 
public discourse on the platform, Hoffman’s team made the conscious 
decision to treat certain targets of allegedly harmful speech differently on 
account of their social status and the public interest in their doings.139 
According to Hoffman, this approach reflected Facebook’s mission 
statement, which at that time was “Make the world more open and 
connected.”140 “Broadly, we interpreted ‘open’ to mean ‘more content.’ Yes, 
that’s a bit of a ‘free speech’ perspective, but then we also had a concern 
with things like bullying and revenge porn,” Hoffman recalled.141 “But while 
trying to take down that bad content, we didn’t want to make it impossible 
for people to criticize the president or a person in the news. It’s important 
there’s a public discussion around issues that affect people, and this is how 
we drew the line.”142  
In trying to resolve these dilemmas, Hoffman and his colleagues sought 
to “focus on the mission” of Facebook rather than adopt “wholesale . . . a 
kind of U.S. jurisprudence free-expression approach.”143 They quickly 
realized, however, that the mission had to be balanced against competing 
interests such as users’ safety and the company’s bottom line.144 While 
Hoffman and Willner were at Facebook, the balance was often struck in 
favor of “leaving content up,” but they were always searching for new ways 
to address concerns about harmful speech.145 “We felt like Facebook was the 
most important platform for this kind of communication, and we felt like it 
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was our responsibility to figure out an answer to this,” said Hoffman.146 
The policy required a way to determine if someone was a public figure. 
When a piece of content was flagged for bullying, Facebook told its 
moderators to use the news aggregator Google News.147 If the person 
allegedly being bullied appeared in a Google News search, moderators 
would consider her a public figure—and the content would stay up.148 
Although some prominent people had blue “verification” checkmarks or 
“public figure” titles on their Facebook pages, these symbols were not 
actually part of the metric used to determine whether someone was a public 
figure under Facebook’s Community Standards.149 As Willner put it,  
The blue checkmark was totally separate from the “public figure” 
designation—an individual user getting a checkmark was much more 
arbitrary and came from a totally different team. Ultimately, it had no 
impact on how you were enforced against as a private or public figure—it 
just meant that you’re one of the cool kids.150 
Facebook’s use of Google News to make public-figure determinations 
provided the platform with a tool that its moderators could use quickly and 
consistently. The ability to implement the underlying policy on such a mass 
scale was, of course, its virtue, at least in Facebook’s eyes. But it was not 
without its drawbacks, as even Facebook’s policymakers recognized. If 
anyone who appeared in a Google News search became a public figure, there 
was no way to know whether they had voluntarily entered the public eye. 
This issue often arose when people were caught up in terrible circumstances 
or publicly shamed in a way that went viral. As Willner put it, “you can think 
of them as involuntary public figures, but another way of saying it might be 
to think of them as sympathetic public figures.”151 Whether it was fair to 
apply the same bullying rules to these people was a question that Google’s 
algorithm was simply unequipped to answer. 
But not all involuntary public figures were plainly sympathetic. 
Consider, for example, the case of Casey Anthony, who became a household 
name after being accused of murdering her daughter in the “Social-Media 
Trial of the Century.”152 Or recall the furor surrounding Rolling Stone’s 
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article about an alleged rape at the University of Virginia, a story that was 
later retracted and dubbed “a complete crock.”153 In both episodes, it was 
difficult for Facebook to identify the “sympathetic” parties caught up in the 
online firestorm that engulfed the platform, especially as the winds changed. 
With Casey Anthony, Willner recalled that Facebook felt torn between 
accepting the court’s “not guilty” verdict and recognizing the hard reality 
that “everyone in America thinks she killed her kid.”154 Similarly, as Willner 
recounted:  
With the Rolling Stone story, when it starts, we believe the victims, and 
that people shouldn’t say mean things about the victims, but then it turns 
out all that’s not true—the victim there was actually the “bad” person. But 
where along in the journey of learning about that entire story do people’s 
minds shift and what do you decide to protect?155  
Despite the fact Google News could hardly provide the nuance to handle 
these edge cases, the company stood by its use as the best way to strike the 
balance between promoting free speech and remedying harmful speech. 
In moderating content related to public figures, Facebook’s 
policymakers began to blur the lines between social status and 
newsworthiness, just as judges have done when applying the First 
Amendment to privacy torts.156 Willner reflected that “calling the exception 
[an exception for] ‘public figures’ was probably a mistake—a more accurate 
way of thinking about it is as a newsworthy person.”157 All that a Google 
News search could tell moderators was that someone’s name had appeared 
in a news source—it could not reliably reveal the person’s true social status, 
the reputability of the source, the veracity of the story, or the genesis of the 
controversy. This framework meant that Facebook ran into many of the same 
issues that have plagued courts in defining the boundaries of 
newsworthiness. As Willner recounted, he saw “newsworthiness” as 
representing a normative “post-hoc judgment that applies to the content as 
it’s supposed to be—to be able to accurately assess it at the time literally 
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calls for time travel.”158  
Facebook’s engineers, while brilliant, had not realized that particular 
Sci-Fi dream, so the platform had to settle for a descriptive concept that 
included everything published in the “news.” But this approach was not 
without its faults, and both Willner and Hoffman foresaw problems created 
by the erosion of traditional media, the rise of self-publishing, and the 
opportunities for mass amplification and virality offered by social media. 
“Now that everyone is their own newsroom, it’s revealed that the emperor 
has no clothes,” recounted Willner.159 “We don’t like how democratized 
reporting has gotten—everyone can be their own news station, and it’s very 
upsetting to people.”160 Nevertheless, given the volume of content on 
Facebook and the subjectivity and unpredictability that would afflict case-
by-case newsworthiness determinations, the platform saw no viable 
alternative to this broad deference to an increasingly unprofessional media 
ecosystem. Moderators needed a tool to make quick and mechanical 
decisions, and a normative newsworthiness standard was too relative to 
measure consistently. As Hoffman remarked, “When we talk about a 
newsworthiness standard, what do we mean? Newsworthy to who and how 
many? If you don’t establish a minimum number of people, then random 
gossip is newsworthy. How is somebody sitting in one of the [Facebook] 
operations places . . . going to decide that?”161 For similar reasons, both 
Hoffman and Willner opposed building a general exception into the 
Community Standards to prevent removal of all “newsworthy” content. 
Facebook’s approach to this issue would develop on a slightly different track. 
B.  NEWSWORTHY CONTENT 
For most of Facebook’s history, the platform made no exceptions for 
content that violated Community Standards but was newsworthy.162 Overtly 
sexual, graphically violent, or “extremist” content would be taken down 
regardless of whether it had cultural or political significance.163 This was a 
deliberate choice made by Hoffman and Willner, but the policy came under 
increasing pressure in recent years.164 
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Members of the policy team recall an incident in 2013 as a turning point 
toward the creation of an exception for newsworthy content.165 In the wake 
of the Boston Marathon bombing, a graphic image of a man in a wheelchair 
began to circulate on Facebook.166 The man was being wheeled away from 
the carnage, one leg ripped open below the knee to reveal a long, bloody 
bone.167 What made this moderation question so fascinating was that there 
were three versions of the photograph.168 One was cropped so that the leg 
was not visible.169 A second was a wide-angle shot in which the leg was 
visible but less obvious.170 The third, and most controversial, clearly showed 
the man’s “insides on the outside”—the content-moderation team’s 
shorthand rule for when content was graphically violent.171 Despite the fact 
that multiple media outlets had published all three photographs, Facebook 
removed any links to or images of the third version.172 “Philosophically, if 
we were going to take the position that [‘insides on the outside’] was our 
definition of gore and we didn’t allow gore, then just because it happened in 
Boston didn’t change that,” remembers one of the team members on call that 
day.173 Policy executives at Facebook disagreed, however, and reinstated all 
such posts on the grounds of newsworthiness.  
For some members of the policy team, who had spent years trying to 
create administrable rules, the imposition of such an exception represented a 
radical departure from the company’s commitment to procedural 
consistency. Some of their complaints echo the Gertz Court’s rationale for 
reining in the plurality’s rule in Rosenbloom.174 In his opinion for the Court 
in Gertz, Justice Lewis Powell worried openly about allowing “judges to 
decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of ‘general or 
public interest’ and which do not.”175 Many at Facebook worried similarly 
that “newsworthiness as a standard is extremely problematic: the question is 
really one of ‘newsworthy to whom?’ and the answer to that is based on ideas 
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of culture and popularity.”176 The result, some feared, would be a mercurial 
exception that would, moreover, privilege American users’ views on 
newsworthiness to the potential detriment of Facebook’s users in other 
countries.177 
Although there were other one-off exceptions made for incidents like 
the Boston Marathon photograph, Facebook’s internal content-moderation 
policies continued to have no general exception for newsworthiness until 
September 2016, when a famous Norwegian author, Tom Egeland, posted a 
well-known historical picture to his Facebook page.178 The photograph, “The 
Terror of War,” depicts a nine-year-old Vietnamese girl naked in the street 
after a napalm attack, and for this reason the photo is often called “Napalm 
Girl.”179 In part because of its graphic nature, the photo was a pivotal piece 
of journalism during the Vietnam War.180 Nonetheless, it violated 
Facebook’s Community Standards.181 Accordingly, Facebook removed the 
photo and suspended Egeland’s account. Because of Egeland’s stature, the 
takedown itself received news coverage. Espen Egil Hansen, the editor-in-
chief of the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, published a “letter” to 
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg on Aftenposten’s front page calling for 
Facebook to take a stand against censorship. Hours later, Facebook’s chief 
operating officer Sheryl Sandberg admitted that the company had made a 
mistake and promised that the rules would be rewritten to allow for posting 
of the photo.182 Shortly thereafter, Facebook issued a press release 
underscoring the company’s commitment to “allowing more items that 
people find newsworthy, significant, or important to the public interest—
even if they might otherwise violate [its] standards.”183 
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The “Terror of War” incident led Facebook to start looking more 
broadly at how it evaluated newsworthiness outside the context of 
cyberbullying. “After the ‘Terror of War’ controversy, we realized that we 
had to create new rules for imagery that we’d normally want to disallow, but 
for context reasons that policy doesn’t work,” said Peter Stern, head of 
Product Policy Stakeholder Engagement at Facebook.184 According to Stern, 
this policy shift “led us to think about newsworthiness across the board.”185 
He acknowledged that Facebook has two considerations when making 
newsworthiness determinations: “Safety of individuals on the one hand and 
voice on the other.”186 But what exactly does “voice” mean in this context? 
Here, again, Facebook has increasingly aligned itself with the courts’ view 
of the relationship between free speech and self-governance. “When 
someone enters the public eye,” Stern explained, “we want to allow a broader 
scope of discussion.”187 
C.  CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 
Over the last two years, Facebook’s content-moderation policies have 
evolved to become somewhat less mechanical and more nuanced. For 
example, Facebook modified its rules on bullying and harassment of public 
figures in 2018. In place of its blanket rule that public figures could never 
enjoy protection from bullying, the platform adopted more context-sensitive 
standards to address some forms of harmful speech about prominent people. 
“Our new policy does not allow certain high-intensity attacks, like calls for 
death, directed at a certain public figure,” members of the Facebook policy 
team reported on a recent call.188 In the past, they explained, a statement such 
as “Kim Kardashian is a whore” would never be removed for bullying or 
harassment (whereas a statement calling a private individual a “whore” 
would be). But now, Facebook will remove some speech directed at public 
figures when it is posted on their own pages or accounts, depending on the 
severity of the language.189 Details of how moderators will make these 
decisions are still vague, but it appears that the platform is beginning to draw 
lines based on both substance (whether the speech is particularly vicious) 
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and directionality (whether the speech is targeted to reach particular public 
figures).190  
Under this new regime, the platform has also tweaked its methods for 
determining someone’s status as a public figure. Google News remains an 
important instrument in the moderator’s toolkit—the platform will bestow 
the label on people mentioned in multiple news stories within a certain 
timeframe—but there are now other ways to qualify.191 Regardless of what 
Google’s algorithm regurgitates, Facebook now counts among its public 
figures people elected or assigned through a political process to a 
government position; people with hundreds of thousands of fans or followers 
on a social-media account; and people employed by a news organization or 
who speak publicly.192 
Facebook’s current policies on newsworthy content are somewhat 
harder to pin down. Unlike the term “public figures,” which Facebook still 
uses primarily for its bullying standards, “newsworthiness” is now a possible 
exception to all of the company’s Community Standards.193 And unlike the 
public-figure designations made in the bullying context, newsworthiness 
determinations do not rely on news aggregators and algorithms.194 Instead, 
Facebook employees review claims about possible newsworthy content on a 
case-by-case basis.195 
In deciding whether to keep up otherwise-removable content because 
of its newsworthiness, Facebook officials stress that they weigh the value of 
“voice” against the risk of harm.196 Assessments of harm are informed by the 
nature as well as the substance of the objectionable content.197 Hateful 
speech on its own, for instance, might be seen as less harmful than a direct 
call to violence.198 Facebook officials maintain, however, that most of the 
newsworthiness decisions relate to nudity. Difficult decisions include what 
to do about nudity in public protests. “Just a few years ago, we took that 
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down,” stated David Caragliano, a policy manager at Facebook.199 “But it’s 
really important to leave this up consistent with our principles of voice. 
That’s led to a policy change that’s now at scale for the platform.”200 The 
non-hateful, nonviolent expressive conduct of public protesters, it seems, 
will today almost always be considered newsworthy and therefore will not 
be taken down, even if it runs afoul of other Community Standards. 
Compared to the thousands of day-to-day decisions made by hordes of 
content moderators who compare content to rules, the “how” and “who” 
behind Facebook’s newsworthiness determinations are more obscure. It is 
unclear, for example, how a question of possible newsworthiness climbs the 
Facebook policymaking ladder to become a new “policy change . . . at scale 
for the platform,” let alone who makes that crucial call.201 The lack of 
transparency and accountability gives little comfort to those who worry 
about the mercurial and subjective nature of newsworthiness determinations 
at Facebook. 
This might be about to change. In November 2018, in “A Blueprint for 
Content Governance and Enforcement,” Mark Zuckerberg informed the 
public that he “increasingly [has] come to believe that Facebook should not 
make so many important decisions about free expression and safety on [its] 
own.”202 He announced that the platform would create an “Independent 
Governance and Oversight” committee to make decisions about the kinds of 
content users could post on the site.203 Some have imagined this new body 
as a “Supreme Court” of Facebook.204 Indeed, Zuckerberg himself used this 
analogy on an April 2018 podcast:  
You can imagine some sort of structure, almost like a Supreme Court, that 
is made up of independent folks who don’t work for Facebook, who 
ultimately make the final judgment call on what should be acceptable 
speech in a community that reflects the social norms and values of people 
all around the world.205  
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The platform is now in the process of soliciting feedback on this idea and 
intends to establish the tribunal by the year’s end.206  
Whatever form Facebook’s Supreme Court takes, it will surely face 
questions about the scope and application of Facebook’s “doctrine” 
concerning public figures and newsworthiness. Actual courts, meanwhile, 
will continue to grapple with these concepts and may face similar questions 
as they confront challenges posed by tort claims arising from online speech. 
With this in mind, Part III now considers the lessons to be learned by 
comparing the public and private approaches to public figures and 
newsworthiness. The constitutional law created by the Old Governors 
greatly influenced the content moderation implemented by the New 
Governors, and the New Governors’ experiences might now enlighten the 
Old Governors in turn. 
III.  FACEBOOK VERSUS SULLIVAN: LESSONS FOR COURTS AND 
PLATFORMS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
As we have seen, the two governance systems now used to adjudicate 
complaints about harmful speech—tort lawsuits in courts and content 
moderation on platforms—share some similarities. Both have developed 
rules that seek to regulate harmful speech while protecting robust public 
discourse that is essential to self-governance. To strike this balance, courts 
and platforms have developed special rules that depend on the content of the 
speech and the parties involved in the dispute. In the courts, defamation law 
gives plaintiffs recourse for untruthful speech about them, but places a 
substantially higher burden on plaintiffs who are public figures.207 On 
Facebook, an anti-bullying policy allows users to remove malicious speech 
about them, but users who are public figures can rarely avail themselves of 
this option.208 In the courts, privacy and IIED law allow plaintiffs to hold 
defendants liable for certain privacy invasions or outrageous conduct, except 
when the underlying speech is deemed to be of legitimate public interest.209 
On Facebook, users can request that disturbing content like graphically 
violent or hateful speech be taken down, except when the content is of 
legitimate public interest.210 Both judges and Facebook policymakers justify 
these rules in similar terms, citing the importance of protecting free speech 
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and the legitimate public interest in discussion about people who are 
powerful, famous, or at the forefront of a particular controversy.211  
The observation that First Amendment concepts like public figures and 
newsworthiness have wended their way into Facebook’s content-moderation 
policies is interesting as a descriptive matter. It is part of a broader story 
about how American laws and norms have gained influence across the globe 
as these potent American companies have expanded their reach abroad.212 
Even though Facebook need not adhere to the First Amendment, its content-
moderation policies were largely developed by American lawyers trained 
and acculturated in American free-speech norms, and it seems that this 
cultural background has affected their thinking.213 By accurately describing 
some of Facebook’s internal processes for moderating content in the way 
that it does, we can better understand Facebook’s power inside and outside 
of the United States—and perhaps some of the external resistance to it, as 
non-Americans bristle at the exportation of foreign values.214 
But comparing these public and private governance systems provides 
more than mere descriptive interest: it also teaches important lessons about 
the challenges posed in the new speech ecosystem created by digital 
discourse today. As an initial matter, the comparison tests intuitions about 
why there are different standards concerning public figures—whether 
through the courts or private platforms—and how those standards relate to 
protections for newsworthy speech. With these rationales exposed, the 
comparison also reveals problems with how courts and platforms have 
implemented their standards for public figures and newsworthiness, 
especially in an era when online speech often influences public discourse. 
Finally, the comparison lays the groundwork to address some of those 
problems—a task briefly undertaken in this Article’s conclusion. 
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A.  THE RATIONALES BEHIND THE RULES 
As this Article has revealed so far, courts and platforms have proffered 
various rationales for creating rules that protect newsworthy speech or 
hamstring public figures subjected to harmful speech. Unpacking these ideas 
tests intuitions about whether those rationales are both descriptively sound 
and normatively desirable. This scrutiny is particularly important today as 
the challenges posed by the digital age force courts to rethink old doctrines 
and lead the public to demand more from the private platforms that now 
govern speech online. 
There have historically been three reasons why public figures have 
faced harsher standards than private figures when seeking recourse for 
harmful speech. The first is that public figures are supposedly “less 
vulnerable” because they have greater access to “channels of effective 
communication” to rebut the harmful speech.215 This rationale—which the 
Court has also described as a public figure’s greater ability to perform “self-
help”—rests on an empirical postulate: that there is a meaningful difference 
between the abilities of public and private figures to engage in counter-
speech that in some way redresses the harm.216 This postulate explains, at 
least in part, why the Court has adopted this rationale in the defamation 
context only. When the harm caused by speech stems from untruth that 
tarnishes someone’s reputation, counter-speech can be an effective tool to 
rebut the lie and thereby address the injury.217 But in the context of privacy 
or emotional harms caused by speech, counter-speech does little to 
ameliorate damage, which helps explain why a plaintiff’s status as a public 
or private figure does little to change his or her legal rights when bringing 
privacy or IIED claims.218 It might also explain why Facebook’s 
policymakers never raise this rationale in explaining their public-figure rules 
related to cyberbullying, which again involves an array of speech harms that 
are not easily redressed through counter-speech.219 Indeed, both offline and 
online, the harm caused by the types of speech that usually trigger privacy, 
IIED, and cyberbullying concerns might actually increase with counter-
speech, either by amplifying the speech through more publicity or by forcing 
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a victim to re-create or re-experience the harm in order to speak out against 
it.220 
The second rationale for applying harsher rules to public figures is that 
they are “less deserving” of protection because they assume the risk of 
possible negative attention when they put themselves in the public eye.221 
The Court has explained that this is a “normative” rationale that depends on 
the idea of voluntariness—the harsher rule is justified because public figures, 
unlike private figures, have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased 
risk of injury.”222 Once again, this reasoning appears crucial only in 
defamation jurisprudence where the Court has repeatedly cabined the scope 
of public-figure status by analyzing whether the plaintiff voluntarily “thrust” 
herself into the vortex of a public controversy.223 (And while the Court flirted 
with the idea of an “involuntary” public figure, the justices have 
conspicuously left this character undefined and undiscovered in the forty 
years since he or she appeared hypothetically in Gertz.224) In privacy and 
IIED law, meanwhile, this rationale has no purchase: for the former, courts 
draw no doctrinal distinction between voluntary and involuntary public 
figures who bring claims for public disclosure of private facts;225 for the 
latter, the Court in Snyder refused to give analytical weight to the plaintiff’s 
status as a private figure involuntarily caught up in a newsworthy protest.226 
Facebook, too, has neglected to adopt this rationale, though it is unclear 
whether this is a decision based on principle or practicality.227 Early on, some 
Facebook policymakers expressed concern about how the platform’s 
algorithmic approach could not test for voluntariness, yet they still adopted 
that approach.228  
The final reason to treat public figures differently rests on the idea that 
their prominence makes them subjects of “legitimate public concern.” Under 
this rationale, which hews most closely to the self-governance theory of the 
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First Amendment, the social status of public figures serves as a proxy for 
their newsworthiness, and public figures thus face harsher standards for the 
sake of cultivating robust public discourse.229 This justification is most 
visible in the standards surrounding privacy law, which immunize disclosure 
of certain sensitive facts as matters of “legitimate public concern” only when 
they relate to a public figure.230 Facebook’s rules surrounding public figures 
have a similar flavor. Using Google News to make status determinations 
means that a person becomes a public figure on Facebook simply by 
appearing in a news story. This mechanism tells the platform nothing 
material about the person, aside from the fact that at least one news source 
decided that the person was newsworthy. This is, of course, a purely 
descriptive conception of newsworthiness—the person is newsworthy 
because they appear in the news—but it nonetheless tracks the proxy 
rationale to some extent. 
This discussion reveals that these various rationales can take different 
forms: they can be grounded in descriptive claims about public figures, such 
as the notion that prominent people can more easily engage in effective self-
help; or they can stem from normative considerations, including ideas of 
fairness, risk assumption, and legitimate scope of public curiosity. 
Ultimately, courts and platforms have used these descriptive and normative 
rationales to craft rules aimed at creating a speech ecosystem that preserves 
robust debate and protects against harmful speech. Whether they have done 
so effectively is another question—one that the following Section now 
attempts to answer. 
B.  JUDGING THE GOVERNORS, NEW AND OLD  
Drawing out the comparisons between the public and private 
approaches to newsworthiness and public figures can teach valuable lessons 
about free speech in terms of both constitutional law and content moderation. 
This Section distills three insights that should enlighten both courts and 
platforms.231 Although Facebook policymakers may have channeled 
doctrines created by courts, the platform’s algorithmic approach fails to 
implement important normative protections baked into the courts’ 
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jurisprudence to justify harsher rules for public figures. Courts and platforms 
should also rethink their approaches to defining public figures in light of new 
phenomena created by social media, particularly given how virality alters 
ideas about voluntariness. Finally, platforms could assuage concerns raised 
by their ad hoc newsworthiness determinations by adopting structural 
changes to become more like the court system. 
1.  The Inaccuracies and Injustices of Algorithmic Authority 
The first lesson learned from a comparative analysis stems from 
Facebook’s approach to unearthing public figures. Facebook’s use of Google 
News to determine whether a person is a public figure provides a vivid 
illustration of the problems raised when such definitions are outsourced 
purely to the media marketplace. Although the platform has suggested that 
this policy may be changing slightly, Facebook’s method for ascertaining 
“public figure” status has traditionally turned on the presence or absence of 
an individual’s name in news search results, which are effectively an 
averaging algorithm of media outlets’ publication decisions. This runs 
straight into the threat of what Clay Shirky has called “algorithmic 
authority,” insofar as “an unmanaged process of extracting value from 
diverse, untrustworthy sources” is treated as authoritative without any 
human second-guessing or vouching for the validity of the outcome.232  
As commentators have pointed out for over fifty years in a closely 
related context, if “newsworthiness” is defined solely in terms of news 
outlets’ publication decisions, then granting a special legal privilege for 
newsworthy content is liable to swallow torts such as invasion of privacy. 
“The publisher has almost certainly published any given report because he 
judged it to be of interest to his audience, and believed that it would 
encourage them to purchase his publications in anticipation of more of the 
same,” a student comment observed in 1963.233 “A plaintiff in a privacy 
action would thus have lost almost before he started.”234 Partly for this 
reason, courts making these determinations have considered a range of 
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factors235 and, especially in recent years, have been unwilling to defer 
entirely to the media.236 They have, in other words, refused to adopt a purely 
descriptive conception of newsworthiness that abdicates definitional 
responsibilities to the media.  
The problems inherent in Facebook’s approach are exacerbated by two 
features of the new speech ecosystem that platforms have themselves helped 
create. The first is that the nature of these platforms can, in some sense, create 
news, as when people become “Facebook Famous.” For example, when a 
Facebook user killed a homeless man in Cleveland and then posted a video 
of the murder on Facebook, it was difficult to determine where the genesis 
of “publicity” begins.237 As Hoffman described, “the problem with using 
Google News to determine public figure is that sometimes . . . the source of 
the Google News result would be Facebook.”238 This feedback loop 
undermines one potential virtue of delegating the public-figure 
determination to an outside algorithm: the notion that doing so would 
provide some legitimacy because it would defer to neutral sources external 
to the platform. There was never an official solution during Hoffman’s tenure 
on how to respond to the circular moment of a person becoming a public 
figure because of their actions on the platform.239 
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The second—and related—problem is that Google News is a news 
aggregator, not a newsroom or newspaper. Courts have justified harsher 
standards for public figures because speech about them tends to be 
newsworthy.240 Facebook’s approach partially adopts this proxy rationale 
because a person’s appearance in the news makes them a public figure.241 
But whereas judicial deference to the press has historically rested upon trust 
in the press as an institution, it is difficult to ascribe the same wisdom to 
Google’s algorithm. Facebook’s tactic of defining “newsworthy people” 
using not the press but a news algorithm raises concerns because someone 
can easily become “newsworthy” without “news judgment.” In the new 
speech ecosystem brought about in part by platforms like Facebook, people 
can be thrust into the public sphere and bypass the gatekeeping function of 
the traditional press.242 In short, there are no editorial desks at Google 
News.243 
All of this creates a kind of inverse Goldilocks principle whereby 
Facebook ends up removing too much benign speech and preserving too 
much harmful speech. As to the former, recall that Facebook’s cyberbullying 
policies traditionally meant that any user could have offensive speech about 
them removed so long as they were not a public figure, and conversely all 
speech about public figures would stay up.244 A purely descriptive approach 
to identifying public figures means that important or influential people slip 
through the cracks and remain “private” figures. News aggregators may 
struggle to capture localized power or notoriety in smaller communities—an 
issue made more problematic by the very nature of social media, which has 
enabled virtual communities to develop their own distinctive cultures and 
social structures.245 Provocative content flagged in these communities may 
not seem to involve any “public figures” when judged against a global 
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Google News search and therefore may be removed even if it involves a 
matter of intense interest within that community. 
Facebook’s algorithmic approach also prioritizes scalability over 
accuracy. Even by their own admission, the platform’s policymakers knew 
that it could not ascertain whether someone was being cyberbullied by 
looking only at the flagged content.246 The use of Google News was thus a 
haphazard way to ensure that prominent people could not use a powerful and 
blunt tool to remove critical speech about them, while still allowing private 
figures to remove potentially verboten content with a simple complaint.247 
According to the many different Facebook employees with whom we have 
spoken over the years, the vast majority of content that gets flagged for 
moderators is not speech that actually violates the platform’s rules but rather 
speech that certain users simply do not like.248 Making important distinctions 
based on an unnuanced mechanism like Google News will inevitably lead to 
false positives. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Facebook’s public-figure 
determinations can preserve too much harmful speech. As courts know all 
too well,249 deferring to the public’s curiosity can sometimes lead to unjust 
results—and Facebook’s approach effectively implements such blind 
deference. It does so in two ways, all of which can be understood as being 
part of a larger problem with algorithmic authority: unlike in the tort system, 
there is no “normative backstop” to prevent people facing unjustly harsh 
rules. First, as we discussed already, courts handling privacy claims have 
increasingly refrained from allowing the media to define newsworthiness by 
insisting that a disclosed fact is a matter of “legitimate” public concern.250 
The idea of legitimacy in this context allows courts and juries to consider 
community mores in defining newsworthiness as a way to prevent “morbid 
and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake.”251 Facebook’s 
approach to defining public figures contains no such limitation; indeed, it is 
tough to imagine how a news algorithm could ever engage in such a complex 
and context-dependent inquiry. As a result, a Facebook user might be denied 
protection against cyberbullying even if he or she appeared in a news story 
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(and thus became a “public figure” on the platform) that violated notions of 
“common decency.”252 This might strike many as an unjust result. 
Facebook’s approach lacks a second normative backstop that courts 
have built into the doctrine: the voluntariness requirement from defamation 
law. As we have seen, courts use the voluntariness rationale to limit harsher 
rules to plaintiffs who are “less deserving” of protection against defamation 
under the theory that they have assumed the risk of injury by voluntarily 
entering the public eye.253 A Google News search cannot provide any such 
limitation. This failing is all the more concerning because involuntary public 
figures—once considered “exceedingly rare” by the Court254—are 
increasingly common in the online realm.255 Countless stories exist of 
relatively unknown individuals being filmed or photographed and then 
finding themselves subject to widespread online shaming and related news 
coverage.256 Should such an individual report any particularly offensive 
posts to Facebook for violating the company’s cyberbullying rules, the 
Google News search results would indicate that the individual is a public 
figure and—at least until recently—the posts would stay up. Google News 
is unequipped to distinguish between situations in which people have 
voluntarily “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public 
controversies”257 and situations in which someone has been catapulted into 
internet stardom through little or no action of their own.258 Concern about 
inequitable treatment for targets of harmful speech is precisely what led the 
Court in cases like Firestone to limit the class of individuals who would face 
the harsher defamation rules reserved for public figures, but Facebook has 
yet to respond to similar fears on its platform.259  
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2.  Voluntariness and Sympathy in the Age of Virality 
To be charitable to Facebook, the platform’s inattention to the 
constitutional concept of voluntariness might reflect a skepticism about its 
normative desirability in the digital age. The Court has insisted that those 
who voluntarily enter the public arena are “less deserving” of protection 
because they assume the risk of negative attention,260 but this premise has 
been undermined by certain features of the new speech ecosystem brought 
about by platforms like Facebook. For this reason, both courts and platforms 
should reform—and maybe even replace—their use of voluntariness as a 
bellwether to decide which people deserve harsher rules in disputes about 
harmful speech as a matter of constitutional law or content moderation. 
For purposes of defamation claims, Gertz’s taxonomy splits the world 
into four types of people: general public figures, who are in “positions of 
such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for 
all purposes”261; limited-purpose public figures, who “thrust themselves to 
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the 
resolution of the issues involved;”262 involuntary public figures, who become 
famous “through no purposeful action of [their] own”263; and private figures, 
who are “more vulnerable to injury” and thus “more deserving of 
recovery.”264 While the first two groups “invite attention and comment” 
through their own purposeful actions, the last two do not—and, as a result, 
the Court has not applied the harsher constitutional rules to involuntary 
public figures or private figures in defamation actions.265 
The same cannot be said for privacy law, which differs from defamation 
law in two important respects. First, privacy law appears to define public 
figures more broadly. The Restatement squashes the general- and limited-
purpose public figure into one category—the “voluntary public figure”—and 
defines a public figure as anyone who “voluntarily places [oneself] in the 
public eye, by engaging in public activities, or by assuming a prominent role 
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in institutions or activities having general economic, cultural, social or 
similar public interest, or by submitting [oneself] or [one’s] work for public 
judgment.”266 This lacks the limitation that the Court has crafted in 
defamation law that limited-purpose public figures must embroil themselves 
in a “public controversy,” which the Court tellingly refused to equate with 
“all controversies of interest to the public” because doing so would reinstate 
the Rosenbloom rule that disavowed the significance of a plaintiff’s social 
status.267 In other words, the “public controversy” requirement serves to limit 
the class of public figures in a way that has no analog in privacy law, where 
you can become a public figure by involving yourself in activities that have 
“public interest.”268 
The second difference between defamation and privacy law is that 
voluntary and involuntary public figures are treated identically in privacy 
law, whereas the Court has yet to clarify the constitutional consequence of 
being an involuntary public figure in defamation law. It seems, however, that 
the logic of the Court’s post-Gertz jurisprudence could not support equal 
treatment for involuntary public figures who bring defamation claims. 
Decisions like Firestone, Wolston, and Proxmire all place great weight on 
the idea of voluntariness,269 which the Court has called the “normative 
consideration” that justifies the harsher rules that public figures face under 
defamation law.270 In Wolston, for example, the Court refused to apply the 
public-figure label to the grand-jury witness who “was dragged unwillingly 
into the controversy.”271 This means that Facebook’s rules for public figures 
hew closer to privacy law because the platform also draws no distinction 
based on voluntariness.272 
To understand why the normative salience of voluntariness might have 
shifted with the rise of platforms like Facebook, it is helpful to run through 
a few real-world examples to test intuitions. With each example, consider 
whether applying a harsher rule (in the courts or on platforms) seems fair 
based on a voluntary-involuntary distinction, and indeed whether that 
distinction has any influence on popular or legal intuitions. This allows 
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courts and platforms to possibly reform the idea of voluntariness—and 
indeed decide whether they should replace it with something else entirely. 
In November 2014, a Twitter user posted a photo of a Target employee 
bagging items behind a cashier.273 The employee was wearing the nametag 
“Alex.”274 In one day, the tweet gained over one thousand retweets and two 
thousand favorites.275 In two days, the “#AlexFromTarget” hashtag had over 
a million Twitter hits and the phrase “Alex From Target” racked up more 
than 200,000 Google searches.276 Before long, Twitter users managed to 
identify “Alex” and unearth his Twitter account, which quickly amassed over 
250,000 followers.277 Alex appeared on the Ellen talk show two days later. 
Death threats, denigrating posts, and “fabricate[d] stories” about him soon 
followed.278 It is hard to argue that Alex from Target, a “global celebrity” 
with hundreds of thousands of social-media followers,279 is merely a private 
figure. Similarly, it is hard to argue that he is a voluntary public figure who 
thrust himself into the vortex of a public controversy by bagging groceries 
at his part-time job.280 At most, then, he is the elusive involuntary public 
figure that the Court believed was “exceedingly rare,”281 though his fleeting 
internet stardom seems different from the public’s interest in the two 
involuntary public figures mentioned in the Restatement—perpetrators and 
victims of crimes.282 
Unlike Alex from Target, some people play a more active role in 
triggering the public’s attention by posting content online that then goes 
viral. Consider the example of Justine Sacco, who tweeted before boarding 
a flight to Cape Town: “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just 
kidding. I’m white!”283 The tweet went viral, and people all around the world 
began following the “#HasJustineLandedYet” hashtag to track her progress 
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as they discussed what she had said.284 When she landed in Cape Town 
eleven hours later, she discovered that she was “the No. 1 worldwide trend 
on Twitter” and had tens of thousands of responses to her tweet.285 The story 
was picked up by several major media outlets,286 and Sacco soon lost her 
job.287 As with Alex from Target, it seems strange to think of Sacco as a 
private figure given her sudden worldwide fame. But whether to dub her a 
“voluntary” or “involuntary” public figure is far from clear. It seems like a 
stretch to say that, under defamation law, she voluntarily “thrust [herself] to 
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the 
resolution of the issues involved,”288 but she might qualify as a voluntary 
public figure under privacy law’s more permissive standard.289 Any 
designation is further complicated by the fact that the public furor on social 
media surrounding Sacco’s tweet arguably created a newsworthy event in its 
own right, even if the underlying events did not.  
Sacco, at least, was an adult who presumably had some sense of the 
possible ramifications of her actions, even if she could not have predicted 
their scale or intensity. Matters become more complicated, however, when 
children become internet sensations. This can be so when they lack the 
maturity to grasp the consequences of their actions, as one might think 
occurred recently with students from Covington Catholic whose interaction 
with a Native American activist became a huge story after videos of the 
incident went viral on social media.290 As one journalist quipped in the 
aftermath, “The thing to remember about the dumbass teens of Covington 
Catholic is that while they are dumbasses, they are also teens.”291 Even 
though the students voluntarily took part in a public march in the middle of 
the nation’s capital while they knew people were filming events on their 
phones, to say that they assumed the risk of such colossal negative 
attention—in the way courts speak of public figures in defamation law—
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seems farfetched.292 
Perhaps more troubling are those children who are “thrust” into the 
limelight by their parents. Six-year-old Adalia Rose Williams, for example, 
gathered nearly six million Facebook fans after her mother set up a page 
about her rare and fatal condition that made Williams age much faster than 
normal.293 The Facebook page was a source of widespread support and 
empathy, but it also drew vile abuse and even a hoax story that Williams had 
died.294 Williams’s mother admitted that she was trying to raise awareness 
about her daughter’s condition by placing her in the public eye.295 Williams 
was, in a sense, “thrust” into a public forum created intentionally to provoke 
widespread engagement and discussion, but Williams herself did nothing to 
encourage her fame. Nonetheless, whether she voluntarily or involuntarily 
garnered public attention, it is hard to think of someone tracked by millions 
of people as a private figure. 
Finally, there are people who have chosen to be in the spotlight but who 
might nonetheless seem deserving of protection against certain types of 
online reactions. Take even the most obvious public figures, like actress and 
comedienne Leslie Jones, who understandably spend much of their time 
trying to gain public attention. Jones was inundated with racist and sexist 
comments on Twitter after she starred in the all-female Ghostbusters 
remake.296 In the wake of the abuse, Jones tweeted “I feel like I’m in a 
personal hell. I didn’t do anything to deserve this.”297 There is no doubt that 
Jones’s fame makes her a public figure under defamation and privacy law. 
 
 
 292. See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979). It is true, of course, that 
Covington students might not qualify as defamation public figures in the courts, despite their online fame. 
See Eugene Volokh, Libel Law and the Covington Boys, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 24, 2019, 1:01 PM), 
https://reason.com/volokh/2019/01/24/libel-law-and-the-covington-boys [https://perma.cc/TH9S-
ZGWJ] (arguing that the students are still private figures because “they weren’t famous or influential 
before this event” and that “just showing up at a rally would [not] qualify” as “voluntarily entering some 
particular debate” to make them limited-purpose public figures). 
 293. Simon Tomlinson, Six-Year-Old Girl with Body of an Old Woman… Who Sings Vanilla Ice, 
Dances Gangnam Style and Has Own Fan Club: Adalia Rose Suffers Rare Premature Aging Condition, 
DAILY MAIL (Feb. 25, 2013, 7:06 AM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2284110/Adalia-Rose-
The-year-old-girl-body-old-woman-progeria.html [https://perma.cc/C3FH-ZCGY]. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Jonathan Weiss, Girl with Rare Genetic Disorder Bullied Online, MED. DAILY (Feb. 26, 2013, 
3:24 PM), https://www.medicaldaily.com/girl-rare-genetic-disorder-bullied-online-244525 [https://per 
ma.cc/D9CS-UNZL]. 
 296. Anna Silman, A Timeline of Leslie Jones’s Horrific Online Abuse, THE CUT (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.thecut.com/2016/08/a-timeline-of-leslie-joness-horrific-online-abuse.html [https://perma.cc 
/2ACG-6STU]. 
 297. Id. 
 
  
2019] FACEBOOK V. SULLIVAN 85 
But whether—as a normative matter—she deserves the harsher 
cyberbullying rules that accompany public-figure status on Facebook is a far 
harder question. 
What can these anecdotes teach courts and platforms as they handle 
disputes in the digital age? The first lesson is that the voluntary-involuntary 
distinction needs reform if it is to retain normative appeal as a barometer for 
how “deserving” a person is of harsher rules. A person’s viral internet fame 
might make it difficult to conceive of her as a private figure, but it might also 
strike us as unfair if that person’s decision to post on social media suffices 
to strip that person of protection under tort law or content-moderation rules. 
This intuition might stem from at least three points about life in the digital 
age. First, even if a person intentionally posts online, it is not safe to presume 
that he or she was intending to provoke an online firestorm and suddenly 
become famous. Second, we might question whether the person truly 
assumed the risk of a viral reaction and all of the baggage that can 
accompany it.298 And third, it is no longer so “rare” to become involuntarily 
famous with little or no “purposeful action of [his or her] own.”299 These 
three points bring to mind a person walking through a forest when the heel 
of her shoe sets off a spark that creates a massive forest fire. He or she may 
have voluntarily taken actions in the world that led to a catastrophic incident, 
but it feels wrong to say that he or she assumed that risk or deserves to be 
punished for arson.300 
This might mean that, in defamation law, courts should narrowly define 
public figures to prevent the exception from swallowing the rule. If, as one 
court has remarked, a public figure is “anyone who is famous or infamous 
because of who he is or what he has done,”301 there will be far too many 
public figures in this world. Courts should vigilantly apply the limitations 
placed on public-figure status in defamation law, insisting that people have 
voluntarily embroiled themselves in a “particular public controversy” and 
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not simply been swept up in events that suddenly become “of interest to the 
public.”302 At the very least, the Supreme Court should bring clarity to the 
constitutional significance of being an involuntary public figure. The Court’s 
post-Gertz jurisprudence suggests that such people do not deserve harsher 
defamation rules, but the time has come for certainty now that they are no 
longer “exceedingly rare.” 
To reform privacy law, courts would need to both narrow the definition 
of a voluntary public figure and distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary public figures. Under current privacy doctrine, a vast range of 
people could be voluntary public figures: posting a Tweet, photo, blog post, 
or status update would all seem to qualify as having “submitted [oneself] or 
[one’s] work for public judgment” so as to make every human who has ever 
had a social-media account a voluntary public figure.303 Even those who 
refrain from social media but get mentioned on it by “engaging in public 
activities” might qualify.304 If not a voluntary public figure, such hapless 
individuals might be involuntary public figures, who are subject to identical 
treatment under privacy law. This lack of distinction is particularly 
troublesome because, as we have seen, platforms themselves have created an 
environment in which virality is a feature of their products and involuntary 
public figures are everywhere.305 
Given the challenges posed by the digital age, perhaps the better 
approach is to replace voluntariness altogether as a normative measurement. 
Now that people voluntarily engage in all sorts of activities that unexpectedly 
spawn virality and fame, one might question whether voluntariness is doing 
the work that it once did to assess who is “less deserving” of protection 
against harmful speech. Put differently, has the ease with which everyone 
can now publish and amplify their speech changed the social (and perhaps 
legal) significance of voluntary engagement in public debate? Moreover, 
does the newfound prevalence of involuntary public figures undermine 
distinctions based on voluntariness now that it is no longer “exceedingly 
rare” to be thrust into the limelight against your will? 
Platforms like Facebook have created an environment that reveals 
problems with penalizing people for “thrusting” themselves into a “public 
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controversy.” To apply harsher rules to people who speak out risks chilling 
valuable expression. This is particularly concerning when targets of harmful 
speech might surrender certain protections as the price of publicly 
responding to online abuse—a dynamic that risks “blaming the victim,” 
heightening their vulnerability, and worsening the harm they might suffer.306 
These concerns might explain why platforms like Facebook eschew 
considerations of voluntariness and instead reach for other normative 
concepts to judge what is “fair” in their systems of private governance. To 
borrow the language of one Facebook policymaker, what might matter is 
whether a person is “sympathetic.” The sympathetic public figure is often 
involuntary, but not always. As Willner put it, “you can think of them as 
involuntary public figures, but another way of saying it might be to think of 
them as sympathetic public figures”307 because they most frequently came 
up with people who were caught up in terrible circumstances or had been 
publicly shamed and that shaming had gone viral.  
It is unclear whether Facebook ever formalized this concept in any 
actual rules, but it is nonetheless useful to consider how it might have 
influenced the platform’s line-drawing in this context. Rather than using an 
empirical fact as a basis for a normative conclusion—such as determining 
whether somebody voluntarily invited public attention as a way to conclude 
that they are “less deserving” of protection—the description of someone as 
“sympathetic” skips straight to an opaque normative analysis about whether 
applying the harsh rule is fair under the circumstances. This makes it a tough 
standard to administer, particularly on a mass scale where such subjectivity 
can breed inconsistency. But the same can be said for legal standards that 
rest on community mores—such as the inquiry into whether a matter is of 
“legitimate” public concern in determining its newsworthiness. Perhaps, 
then, the “sympathetic” public figure is not so different from the person who, 
under privacy or IIED law, must face harsher rules for the sake of ensuring 
robust public discourse. 
We might begin to give some shape to the concept of the sympathetic 
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public figure by analyzing how it might fare better than the notion of 
voluntariness in the digital age. As we have seen, voluntariness can still 
influence the normative calculus in certain circumstances: Alex from Target 
might eventually become a public figure following his online stardom, but it 
feels odd to treat him identically to someone like Donald Trump given that 
Alex did nothing (aside from being handsome while bagging groceries!) to 
encourage his fame.308 But we might also worry about how fair it is for courts 
and platforms to apply harsher rules to the likes of Justine Sacco, the 
Covington Catholic students, and Adalia Rose even though all of them, in 
some sense, became famous through voluntary actions taken by themselves 
or their legal guardians.309 What ties these three anecdotes together is that it 
seems unlikely that the people involved foresaw that their actions would spur 
such a significant reaction and transform them into public figures, nor would 
a reasonable person have foreseen it either. It therefore seems unfair to say—
as we might in defamation law—that they are “less deserving” of protection 
because they assumed the risk of becoming targets of harmful speech due to 
their own voluntary actions.310 
If Facebook and other platforms are serious about replacing the concept 
of voluntariness with something like “sympathy,” they cannot rely on 
algorithms and automation to do the job. These judgments are too nuanced 
and depend on understanding context and complicated social facts, so 
mechanical application of the standard will fail. Google News, then, must be 
replaced or supplemented by other tools that, at least at some point in the 
process, incorporate human review. Without it, platforms will run headlong 
into the same problems discussed in the previous Section, whereby 
algorithmic authority removes any normative backstop and implements a 
purely descriptive approach. Still, this case-by-case approach is not without 
its drawbacks, as we will now see. 
3.  The Perils of Ad Hoc Exceptions 
Merely including humans in the mix is not necessarily a solution to the 
problems posed by algorithmic authority and the new speech ecosystem that 
platforms have helped create. Facebook’s experiences implementing its ad 
hoc newsworthiness exception are proof of the perils of case-by-case 
adjudication in this area. Given courts’ parallel experiences, this should 
come as no surprise. Indeed, similar concerns animated the Supreme Court’s 
decision to overrule Rosenbloom in Gertz, in which Justice Lewis Powell 
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warned of the dangers of “forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad 
hoc basis which publications address issues of ‘general or public interest’ 
and which do not—to determine . . . ‘what information is relevant to self-
government.’”311 If the Court “doubt[ed] the wisdom of committing this task 
to the conscience of judges” in the court system,312 we might also worry 
about Facebook executives acting similarly behind closed doors. 
As things stand, Facebook and other platforms seem to deviate from 
their rules if a high-ranking policymaker at the company intervenes and 
determines that a piece of content is newsworthy. This overarching exception 
applies to all types of content on Facebook. In the context of Napalm Girl, 
for instance, Sheryl Sandberg intervened and Facebook’s rules against 
nudity ultimately gave way to a determination within the platform that it was 
“an iconic image of historical importance.”313 And when then-candidate 
Donald Trump’s posts about his Muslim ban appeared to run afoul of 
Facebook’s rules against hate speech, they stayed up after Mark Zuckerberg 
and senior members of Facebook’s policy team concluded that they were 
“newsworthy, significant, or important to the public interest.”314 No doubt 
some newsworthiness judgments fall to policymakers who are lower on the 
Facebook totem pole, but the important point is that these decisions are made 
by humans—not algorithms—and often stem from company higher-ups.  
Facebook’s newsworthiness exception in some ways mirrors the courts’ 
treatment of the same concept in privacy and IIED law. The interests served 
by both torts give way to a constitutional commitment to protecting robust 
discourse on matters of public concern, a determination that is often 
influenced by the judgment of the press.315 But newsworthiness 
determinations at Facebook are made by an anonymous and somewhat 
arbitrary group of policy executives.316 This infects the adjudication process 
with various problems and exposes a more systemic issue: the dearth of 
accountability that a private company like Facebook has to its users, despite 
impacting its users’ speech rights on the platform. 
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The first problem created by ad hoc exceptions at platforms is that they 
might suffer from a lack of expertise or professional norms. At least in the 
courts, newsworthiness determinations are often shaped by deference to the 
traditional news media, where society has come to expect some level of skill, 
experience, and professionalism.317 Even when tort claims do not involve a 
media defendant, judges themselves are usually proficient at reading and 
interpreting past decisions and deciding how they should apply in analogous 
contexts. It is at best unclear if we can expect the same from Facebook 
policymakers. Some may have expertise in content moderation, but others 
are there to represent the platform’s business interests. Because users do not 
really know who is making these decisions, they are unable to judge what 
their skewed incentives might be.318 But one thing is for sure: the decisions 
are currently made by Facebook insiders, and not by any neutral overseer 
less likely to prioritize the company’s profits or prestige. 
What little we do know about Facebook’s decisionmaking process in 
this area is concerning. At least anecdotally, it seems that powerful and 
connected people are more likely to get favorable treatment. This 
materializes in two ways. For one, when prominent people complain about 
content takedowns, the platforms seem more likely to listen. When a Danish 
politician posted a photo of Copenhagen’s iconic Little Mermaid statue on 
Facebook, the platform removed it for violating its nudity rules because the 
image featured “too much bare skin or sexual undertones.”319 After the 
politician complained publicly, Facebook backtracked and reinstated the 
post.320 Similarly, after Facebook removed a post by a group of journalists 
in the Philippines criticizing President Rodrigo Duterte, the group was able 
to mobilize public pressure and persuade the platform to reinstate it.321 
Facebook may have provided everyone with a platform, but that does not 
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mean that everyone is heard equally.322 
The second way that platforms entrench power with the powerful is by 
allowing influential people to speak in ways that the general public cannot. 
Again, at least anecdotally, Facebook seems more likely to find the speech 
of public figures to be newsworthy, meaning that powerful users will often 
get a pass even when their content violates the platform’s rules. Zuckerberg 
conceded as much when he justified the decision to treat Trump differently 
because his status as a “public figure” made the posts about the Muslim ban 
“newsworthy.”323 In the aftermath of that decision, Facebook announced that 
it would “begin allowing more items that people find newsworthy, 
significant, or important to the public interest—even if they might otherwise 
violate [its] standards.”324 This preferential treatment is worsened by what 
Jillian York has called the “tornadoes of celebrity,” whereby different 
platforms reinforce each other in a way that creates new celebrities and then 
helps them remain powerful.325 
Even though Facebook has now openly said that it makes exceptions 
for newsworthy content, it has given little insight into how it defines 
newsworthiness. Senior Facebook executive Peter Stern has said that the 
platform considers “safety of individuals on the one hand and voice on the 
other,” but “voice” is a nebulous concept to say the least.326 If policymakers 
are making these calls on a case-by-case basis, without the benefit of a body 
of reasoned decisions from past cases, there is a risk that mere human whim 
can lead to erratic and arbitrary results. Of course, a nuanced and ambiguous 
standard like newsworthiness is always susceptible to inconsistent 
application, but Facebook has given us little confidence that it can reliably 
and fairly make these calls. 
One cause for skepticism is the apparent American-centric conclusions 
that Facebook has drawn in this area. As we saw, the platform was quick to 
abandon its anti-gore rules to allow images of a Boston Marathon victim to 
 
 
 322. See Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., EFF, Human Rights Watch, and Over 70 Civil 
Society Groups Ask Mark Zuckerberg to Provide All Users with Mechanism to Appeal Content 
Censorship on Facebook (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-human-rights-watch-
and-over-70-civil-society-groups-ask-mark-zuckerberg-provide [https://perma.cc/TR6L-TERT]. 
 323. Seetharaman, supra note 314. 
 324. Kaplan & Osofsky, supra note 183. 
 325. Jillian York, Director of Int’l Freedom of Expression, Elec. Frontier Found., Speech at the 
re:publica 2018 Conference: The New Kingmakers: How Silicon Valley Created a New Culture of 
Celebrity (May 6, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rl9JX5jmY0M [https://perma.cc/FGP6-
CDJ7]. 
 326. Telephone Interview with Peter Stern, supra note 184. 
 
  
92 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:37 
remain online.327 But when users made similar requests concerning videos 
depicting brutal violence committed by Mexican drug cartels, the result was 
quite different.328 Lower-level Facebook employees deemed the Mexican 
videos newsworthy, but a high-ranking executive overruled them following 
intense backlash in the media.329 The platform’s rule seemed to shift 
depending on what side of the border the event occurred. Likewise, while 
Trump’s Islamophobic posts about banning all Muslim immigration were 
saved due to their newsworthiness, Facebook removed posts by the son of 
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu wishing that “all Muslims leave 
the land of Israel.”330  
This form of American exceptionalism is, in some sense, unsurprising. 
Facebook is an American company run largely by Americans, so a normative 
concept like newsworthiness has predictably been influenced by American 
norms. Yet what makes this trend at Facebook so interesting is that it seems 
contrary to how the leaders at the platform conceive of their mission. When 
Zuckerberg first raised the idea of creating a “Supreme Court” for content 
moderation, he extolled its virtue as a body that could “make the final 
judgment call on what should be acceptable speech in a community that 
reflects the social norms and values of people all around the world.”331 This 
is an ambitious—and perhaps impossible—goal: the nature of norms and 
values is that they often develop differently within dissimilar communities. 
Facebook may wish that it could create one set of Community Standards that 
would satisfy everyone within its polity, but the reality is that these global 
platforms simply cannot craft policies that represent worldwide “norms and 
values” that do not exist—particularly surrounding such complex and 
contestable notions as the boundaries of free speech. Facebook will need to 
choose the values it wants to reflect in its content moderation, but the 
questions of how it will choose them and what those values might be remains 
unanswered. 
In sum, several lessons emerge from a comparative analysis of courts’ 
and platforms’ treatment of public figures and newsworthiness. For starters, 
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Facebook’s use of Google News for its public-figure determinations 
underscores the dangers of reducing such judgments to mechanical 
calculations: when followed strictly, they can result in either taking down or 
keeping up too much speech. This approach, which necessarily jettisons the 
“voluntariness” caveat recognized by the courts, can lead to inaccurate and 
unjust results. Although Facebook and other platforms have proliferated the 
once-rare “involuntary public figure” imagined in Gertz, they—and the 
courts—have yet to reckon with this new reality. These issues reveal that the 
new speech ecosystem created by platforms like Facebook has indeed eroded 
the empirical postulate at the core of the public-figure doctrine—that is, if 
you are a public figure, you have greater access to channels of 
communication—now that everyone has a platform. Yet despite this 
apparent equalization of speech access, the result is often less than 
egalitarian. The powerful and connected often get better rules and treatment, 
not all speech receives equal attention or amplification, and the mechanisms 
used by Facebook to regulate speech—though increasingly transparent—
remain largely opaque and unaccountable to users. Facebook’s struggle to 
create principled exceptions for newsworthy content underscores how the 
company straddles the roles of the legislature, executive, judiciary, and press 
in controlling access to speech for both speakers and listeners. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article reveals, platforms like Facebook have fundamentally 
altered the nature of the global speech ecosystem.332 They have given 
everyone a platform to speak, dramatically reducing the barriers to entry in 
public debate. They have facilitated the amplification of speech, allowing 
users to reach broad audiences in places near and far. They have created both 
opportunities and dangers by enabling virality, accelerating and extending 
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the influence of speech by previously obscure people. And they have 
developed a new system of governance, adjudicating the boundaries between 
protecting free speech and preventing harmful speech. 
In the age dominated by the Old Governors, speech governance was 
essentially split between the legislature, executive, judiciary, and press.333 
At least in the United States, this governance system was divided between 
three branches of government, created and backed by values enshrined in the 
Constitution. Congress and state legislatures would make laws, those laws 
would be enforced by executive branches, and the legality of those laws 
would be measured against the Constitution by courts.334 As a check against 
all of this official governance was the so-called “Fourth Estate” of the press, 
which enjoyed its own constitutional protection in its role as watchdog of the 
government and caretaker of an informed electorate.335 The press’s decisions 
of what to publish—what was “newsworthy”—were made by editorial 
boards and given some deference in courts.336 Collectively, as Balkin has 
argued, this was the system of “old-school speech regulation.”337 
Today, in the age of the New Governors, we can see shadows of these 
various roles, but in a quite different construct. Much of the governance of 
online speech is done by private platforms that fulfill all of these roles—
legislature, executive, judiciary, and press—at once. At Facebook, policy 
teams make rules on content, moderators enforce those rules in response to 
flagged content, and escalations teams review whether those enforcements 
were correct or if larger changes should be made in policy.338 And while the 
media still plays an important role in raising awareness about problematic 
content-moderation rules or decisions,339 platforms are also publishers of 
speech and act as editorial boards determining what types of content see the 
light of day. Platforms are both the governors, setting speech policies and 
adjudicating speech disputes, and the publishers, controlling access to speech 
on behalf of speakers and listeners. They are the Sullivan Court, and they are 
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the New York Times. 
Facebook seems to realize these parallels as well. Though it is just one 
of many speech platforms, it is leading the way in attempting to build 
accountability and oversight into its speech policies. By creating an 
independent “Oversight Board” to make policy and appeals determinations 
concerning the content users may post, Zuckerberg spoke directly to 
concerns raised by the consolidation of power at the platform.340 Indeed, in 
his blog post making the announcement, he stated that creating the tribunal 
was an attempt to “prevent the concentration of too much decision-making 
within [its] teams” and to “provide assurance that these decisions are made 
in the best interests of [the] community and not for commercial reasons.”341 
Concerns about Facebook’s incentives have led some to worry that the body 
will be “more soundbite than substance,”342 but there are promising signs 
that Zuckerberg will put his money where his mouth is—both literally and 
figuratively. In January 2019, the platform released a few more specifics 
about how the body might operate. In order to “render independent 
judgment” on the platform’s speech policies, the body may “[r]everse 
Facebook’s decisions when necessary.”343 According to the announcement, 
members of the board “will be obligated to the people who use Facebook—
not Facebook the company.”344 Facebook even published a “Draft Charter” 
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for the board, which included commitments that the board would “share its 
decisions transparently and give reasons for them” and that “Facebook will 
accept and implement the board’s decisions.”345 Most significantly, the 
Charter also revealed that the board will base its decisions not only on 
Facebook’s pre-existing Community Standards, but also on “a set of values, 
which will include concepts like voice, safety, equity, dignity, equality and 
privacy.”346 These values, which sound akin to constitutional provisions, will 
be included in a final charter “that will serve as the basis for board 
governance.”347  
Between January and June 2019, Facebook sought external advice on 
what the Oversight Board should look like.348 Over those six months, it 
“heard from more than 650 people from 88 countries represented at 22 
smaller global roundtables,” gathered “feedback from more than 250 experts 
in one-on-one meetings,” and established “an online ‘public consultation’ 
process, which encouraged users to both answer polls and submit essays on 
what they thought the board should look like.”349 As one might expect from 
such a global listening tour, the lengthy report released in late June 
summarizing the platform’s findings raises more questions than answers.350 
But it does demonstrate Facebook’s commitment to seeking out the opinions 
and thoughts of users and stakeholders worldwide and providing 
transparency in reporting those findings, which will hopefully influence the 
Oversight Board’s final charter.351 
Facebook is in the midst of its own kind of Constitutional Convention 
that could fundamentally alter its nature and the way it governs online 
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speech.352 Zuckerberg seems to have finally come to terms with his 
tremendous power, acknowledging that decisions about how to “balance 
safety and free expression . . . are too consequential for Facebook to make 
alone.”353 With the advent of an oversight body that aspires to bring 
“independent judgment to hard cases,”354 the platform is on the cusp of 
creating a meaningful check on its own power that could have ripple effects 
throughout the industry and reshape public discourse on the internet. This 
may seem hyperbolic, but Facebook’s 2.3 billion users leave a giant footprint 
on the character of online speech—and the nature of the platform’s 
governance over them is among the most pressing issues concerning freedom 
of expression in the digital age. 
Facebook’s influence over online speech makes critical oversight all the 
more important. As the comparative analysis in this Article has shown, 
Facebook’s approach to issues surrounding public figures and 
newsworthiness raises a host of problems. The platform’s use of Google 
News to determine public-figure status is purely descriptive and lacks a 
normative backstop to consider concepts like voluntariness or community 
mores.355 Yet if Facebook deviates from its algorithmic tools to make 
exceptions based on human judgment, it risks creating arbitrary and 
inconsistent results through an opaque process that is largely hidden from its 
users.356 Facebook’s exceptions for newsworthy content raise similar 
concerns.357 Although the platform strives vaguely to balance the “voice” of 
its users against the “safety” of it users,358 when it comes to difficult issues 
surrounding “sympathetic” public figures and highly contextual 
newsworthiness determinations, the lack of transparent and granular 
articulations of the platform’s decisions can lead to a host of problems.359 
This Article has revealed the inner workings of Facebook’s content 
moderation surrounding the crucial concepts of public figures and 
newsworthiness. The rules and processes that the platform has adopted have 
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deep roots in First Amendment law, but they differ in critical respects. By 
comparing the old and new systems of speech governance, this Article has 
exposed flaws in both. But these flaws are not fatal—both judges and 
platform policymakers can change their doctrines to adapt to challenges 
posed by the new speech ecosystem brought about by companies like 
Facebook. The battle over how to protect free speech while regulating 
harmful speech must now be fought on two fronts: through tort law in courts 
and content moderation on platforms. While the Old Governors have long-
established structures to adjudicate the public’s claims, the New Governors 
are still building theirs.  
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